Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 47 Opinion of the Court ment has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our Nation’s political process. Cf. 2 U. S. C. §441e (contribution and expenditure ban applied to “foreign national[s]”). Section 441b is not limited to corporations or associations that were created in foreign countries or funded predominately by foreign shareholders. Section 441b therefore would be overbroad even if we assumed, arguendo, that the Gov ernment has a compelling interest in limiting foreign influence over our political process. See Broadrick, 413 U. S., at 615. C Our precedent is to be respected unless the most con vincing of reasons demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a course that is sure error. “Beyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned.” Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 13) (over ruling Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986)). We have also examined whether “experience has pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 8) (overruling Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194 (2001)). These considerations counsel in favor of rejecting Aus tin, which itself contravened this Court’s earlier prece dents in Buckley and Bellotti. “This Court has not hesi tated to overrule decisions offensive to the First Amendment.” WRTL, 551 U. S., at 500 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). “[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a me chanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.” Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119 (1940). For the reasons above, it must be concluded that Austin was not well reasoned. The Government defends Austin,