Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010)
49
Opinion of the Court
may possess valuable expertise, leaving them the best
equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of
all sorts, including the speech of candidates and elected
officials.
Rapid changes in technology—and the creative dynamic
inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against
upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain
media or by certain speakers. See Part II–C, supra.
Today, 30-second television ads may be the most effective
way to convey a political message. See McConnell, supra,
at 261 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Soon, however, it may be
that Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking
Web sites, will provide citizens with significant informa
tion about political candidates and issues. Yet, §441b
would seem to ban a blog post expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a candidate if that blog were created
with corporate funds. See 2 U. S. C. §441b(a); MCFL,
supra, at 249. The First Amendment does not permit
Congress to make these categorical distinctions based on
the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of
the political speech.
No serious reliance interests are at stake. As the Court
stated in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991),
reliance interests are important considerations in property
and contract cases, where parties may have acted in con
formance with existing legal rules in order to conduct
transactions. Here, though, parties have been prevented
from acting—corporations have been banned from making
independent expenditures. Legislatures may have en
acted bans on corporate expenditures believing that those
bans were constitutional. This is not a compelling interest
for stare decisis. If it were, legislative acts could prevent
us from overruling our own precedents, thereby interfer
ing with our duty “to say what the law is.” Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
Due consideration leads to this conclusion: Austin, 494