10
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
Politics: Justice Marshall’s Jurisprudence on Law and
Politics, 52 Howard L. J. 655, 669 (2009) (Austin “has been
understood by most commentators to be an opinion driven
by equality considerations, albeit disguised in the lan
guage of ‘political corruption’ ”) with post, at 74 (Austin’s
rationale “is manifestly not just an ‘equalizing’ ideal in
disguise”).2
It should not be surprising, then, that Members of the
Court have relied on Austin’s expansive logic to justify
greater incursions on the First Amendment, even outside
the original context of corporate advocacy on behalf of
candidates running for office. See, e.g., Davis v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 7–
8) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(relying on Austin and other cases to justify restrictions on
campaign spending by individual candidates, explaining
that “there is no reason that their logic—specifically, their
concerns about the corrosive and distorting effects of
wealth on our political process—is not equally applicable
in the context of individual wealth”); McConnell, supra, at
203–209 (extending Austin beyond its original context to
cover not only the “functional equivalent” of express advo
cacy by corporations, but also electioneering speech con
ducted by labor unions). The dissent in this case suc
cumbs to the same temptation, suggesting that Austin
justifies prohibiting corporate speech because such speech
——————
2 See
also, e.g., R. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law:
Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore 114 (2003) (“Aus
tin represents the first and only case [before McConnell] in which a
majority of the Court accepted, in deed if not in word, the equality
rationale as a permissible state interest”); Strauss, Corruption, Equal
ity, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1369, 1369, and
n. 1 (1994) (noting that Austin’s rationale was based on equalizing
political speech); Ashdown, Controlling Campaign Spending and the
“New Corruption”: Waiting for the Court, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 767, 781
(1991); Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broad
casting, 1990 S. Ct. Rev. 105, 108–111.