Guide on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 – Right to free elections choice of electoral system by which the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature is ensured – whether it be based on proportional representation, the “first-past-thepost” system or some other arrangement – is a matter in which the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation (Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], 1999, § 64). B. Principles of interpretation 11. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 differs from the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Party to hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, having regard to the preparatory work in respect of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and the interpretation of the provision in the context of the Convention as a whole, the Court has established that this provision also implies individual rights, comprising the right to vote (the “active” aspect) and to stand for election (the “passive” aspect) (Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 1987, §§ 48-51; Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], 2006, § 102). 12. The rights in question are not absolute. There is room for “implied limitations”, and the Contracting States must be given a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere. The concept of “implied limitations” under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is of major importance for the determination of the relevance of the aims pursued by the restrictions on the rights guaranteed by this provision. Given that Article 3 is not limited by a specific list of “legitimate aims” such as those enumerated in Articles 8 to 11, the Contracting States are therefore free to rely on an aim not contained in that list to justify a restriction, provided that the compatibility of that aim with the principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention is proved in the particular circumstances of a given case. 13. The concept of “implied limitations” also means that the Court does not apply the traditional tests of “necessity” or “pressing social need” which are used in the context of Articles 8 to 11. In examining compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has focused mainly on two criteria: whether there has been arbitrariness or a lack of proportionality, and whether the restriction has interfered with the free expression of the opinion of the people. In addition, it underlines the need to assess any electoral legislation in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned, which means that unacceptable features in one system may be justified in another (Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 1987, § 52; Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], 2006, §§ 103-104 and 115). 14. Stricter requirements may be imposed on eligibility to stand for election to Parliament (the “passive” aspect) than is the case for eligibility to vote (the “active” aspect). In fact, while the test relating to the “active” aspect of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 has usually included a wider assessment of the proportionality of the statutory provisions disqualifying a person or a group of persons from the right to vote, the Court’s test in relation to the “passive” aspect has been limited largely to verification of the absence of arbitrariness in the domestic procedures leading to disqualification of an individual from standing as a candidate (Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], 2006, § 115; Melnychenko v. Ukraine, 2004, § 57). 15. As to the question of who is entitled to rely on an alleged violation of the “passive” aspect of the right, the Court has admitted that, where electoral law or national authorities restrict the right of candidates individually to stand for election on a party’s list, the party concerned may, in that capacity, claim to be a victim of such a violation independently of its candidates (Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, 2008, §§ 72-74; Riza and Others v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 142). 16. In addition, when it subjects a country’s electoral system to its examination – whether it concerns the active or the passive aspect –, the Court takes account of the diversity of the States’ historical contexts. Those different contexts may thus lead the Court to accepting divergences in European Court of Human Rights 7/35 Last update: 30.04.2021