18 (See also the dissenting opinion of Njoki Ndung’u SCJ in Evans Odhiambo Kidero & 4 Others v Ferdinand Ndung’u Waititu & 4 Others, Supreme Court Petition No. 18 of 2014 at paras 217–218) 1.9.9.7 The above constitutional values and principles require election courts to appraise the validity of impugned elections from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. The quantitative test is most relevant where numbers and figures are in question while the qualitative test is most suitable where the quality of the entire election process is questioned and the court must determine whether the election was free and fair (Rozaah Akinyi Buyu v IEBC & 2 Others, Kisumu Election Petition No. 3 of 2013). 1.9.9.8 In Dickson Mwenda Kithinji v Gatirau Peter Munya & 2 Others, Nyeri Civil Appeal No. 38 of 2013, the Court of Appeal explained the constitutional basis for appraising an impugned election from both qualitative and the qualitative perspectives in the following words: to determine whether the results as declared in an election ought to be disturbed, the court is not dealing with a mathematical puzzle and its task is not just to consider who got the highest number of votes. The court has to consider whether the grounds as raised in the petition sufficiently challenge the entire electoral process and lead to a conclusion that the process was not transparent, free and fair. It is not just a question of who got more votes than the other. It cannot be said that the end justifies the means. It a democratic election, the means by which a winner is declared plays a very important role. The votes must be verifiable by the paper trail left behind, it must be demonstrated that there existed favourable circumstances for a fair election and that no party was prejudiced by an act or omission of an election official. (See also the dictum of Omolo JA in James Omingo Magara v Manson Onyongo Nyamweya & 2 Others, Kisumu Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2010). 1.9.9.9 In view of the country’s unfortunate history of delayed electoral justice, contemporary EDR is driven by the constitutional imperative of timely resolution of electoral disputes (Article 87(1) of the Constitution; Cornel Rasanga Amoth v William Oduol & 2 Others, Kisumu Civil Appeal Application No. 26 of 2013). 1.9.9.10 Last, but not least, the courts discharge their adjudicatory function in EDR on the premise that the role of choosing the country’s political leaders lies with the people. In other words, the courts will strive to give effect to the political choices made by the people at the ballot as much as possible, to the extent that such choices are clearly ascertainable. As explained in Richard Kalembe Ndile & Another v Patrick Musimba Mweu & 2 Others, Machakos Election Petitions Nos. 1 and 7 of 2013): Under our democratic form of government, an election is the ultimate expression of sovereignty of the people and the electoral system is designed to ascertain and implement the will of the people. The bedrock principle of election dispute resolution is to ascertain the intent of the voters and to give it effect whenever possible… (See also Hassan Abdalla Albeity v Abu Chiaba & Another, Malindi Election Petition No. 9 of 2013 and Jared Odoyo Okello v IEBC & 3 Others, Kisumu Election Petition No. 1 of 2013. 1.9.9.11 Since the role of electing the country’s political leaders lies with the people rather than the courts, the courts will not nullify an election based on trivial errors or irregularities arising from natural human imperfection, where such errors or irregularities have no bearing on the BENCH BOOK ON ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION