Barbados and the Guyana statutes there is a drafting slip21. In keeping with the Agreement, the words ‘Subject to section 7’ should really be and must be interpreted to mean, ‘Subject to section 6’. The point is that, on their face, these provisions in the CCJ Act (sections 6(c) and 8) permit this Court jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Court of Appeal as of right in any civil proceedings which involve a question as to the interpretation of the Constitution and/or to grant special leave in an appeal from the Court of Appeal in any civil matter. [27] Sections 6(c) and 8, however, must be juxtaposed against section 4(3) of the CCJ Act. The latter provision states: 4 (3) Nothing in this Act shall confer jurisdiction on the Court to hear matters in relation to any decision of the Court of Appeal which at the time of entry into force of this Act was declared to be final by any law. Article 177(4) set out above at [11], is such a law. This was accepted by all parties and this Court has unstinting respect for the finality that it ordains. Yet, Article 177(4) must be read, not in isolation, but contextually, purposefully and harmoniously together with the entirety of the Constitution and, in particular, all of Article 177 and Article 163. [28] Article 177(4) is a limited, circumscribed carve out of the broad jurisdiction of this Court to grant special leave applications and to entertain and determine appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeal in any civil matter. It contains a finality clause that creates an exception to the legal regime described at [23] to [26] above that generally renders appeals in civil matters capable of reaching this Court. Incidentally, along with that exception, Article 177(4) also affords the Court of Appeal an exclusive but very limited original jurisdiction in relation to elections in Guyana, for it is the High Court that is given exclusive jurisdiction over such elections pursuant to Article 163, as discussed in more detail below. Provisions 21 Mirchandani (n 17) [31].