• The independence of the EDRB • The independence and impartiality of EDRB members • A regime for the accountability and liability of the EDRB and its members • The integrity and professionalism of the members of the EDRB • The financial independence and sustainability of the EDRB a) Independence of the EDRB 236. The independence of the EDRB is, like that of any court of law, a cornerstone of the rule of law. It is also a cornerstone of respect for electoral and human rights. The functional independence of the EDRB, including the office of the competent body to investigate and prosecute electoral crimes and offences, is a precondition for the fair, effective and impartial resolution of electoral challenges. The same is true of the EMB in its role of hearing and deciding some electoral challenges. 237. While those EDRBs that are part of a country’s judicial branch embody the guarantees inherent to that judiciary, the constitutional arrangements in most countries that entrust the EDR system to other bodies (a constitutional court or council, administrative court, specialized electoral court, independent EMB or an ad hoc body) generally grant them broad functional independence in relation to the traditional branches of government (legislative, executive and judicial). 238. Constitutional courts or councils generally have a constitutional rank and status equivalent to that of the other branches of government. The other EDRBs that are judicial in nature are often considered independent constitutional organs, and there are even specialized electoral courts and independent EMBs that are designated either implicitly or explicitly in the constitution as a branch of government. This is the case, for example, with the Supreme Electoral Council of Nicaragua, which, as is noted above, is explicitly considered the Poder Electoral (electoral branch), tantamount to a fourth branch of government (see paragraph 198), and is also the case in Venezuela. 239. According to contemporary constitutional theory, it is possible to have constitutionally created bodies (e.g. constitutional courts or councils, autonomous administrative or electoral courts and/or independent EMBs) that are not situated in any of the three classic branches of government. Although constitutions generally provide that sovereignty is exercised indirectly through the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, none prohibits 89 6. Principles and guarantees of EDR systems Box 6.1. Guiding principles of EDRB design from which structural guarantees are developed