over dispute resolution, relied on the EMB for funding. Despite public calls for it to be made independent of the EMB and other institutions of the state, the General Election Law stipulated that it should be established by the EMB and be administratively accountable to the EMB. This legislation resulted in a bottleneck when the EMB failed to forward the Committee’s draft budget to the legislature in due time, resulting in severe budget cuts. One notable request that was cut by the EMB was the appointment of election supervisors at the village level (one per village). This weakened the Committee’s dispute resolution capacity. This scheme was later reinstated by lawmakers and included in a subsequent law that governed the 2009 general elections. 258. Following the trend that courts should not be involved in administrative issues, which are entrusted to judicial councils (on which usually only some of the members are judges), administration, oversight and discipline of Mexico’s federal Electoral Court (Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación) is entrusted to an Administrative Committee made up of the President of the Electoral Court, who chairs it, a judge from its upper chamber, chosen randomly, and three members of the Federal Judicial Council (Consejo de la Judicatura Federal). b) Independence and impartiality of the members of the EDRB 259. In order to impart justice in a manner that is absolutely faithful to the mandate of the constitution and the law, it is not enough for EDRBs to enjoy structural autonomy and functional independence. It is also necessary that those who judge electoral matters act with absolute independence, impartiality and professionalism in their individual capacity, without recognizing any subordination to any interest or will other than those stated by law. The mechanisms for guaranteeing the independence and impartiality of the members of the EDRB are shown in box 6.4. Box 6.4. Guarantees for the independence and impartiality of the members of the EDRB • Establishing their independence and impartiality in the constitution • Procedure for selection and appointment • Requirements for suitability and professionalism • Stability and career service • Appropriate remuneration • Incompatibility with holding other positions • Provisions for standing aside from a case where impartiality may be questioned 94