204. Article 79 of the Turkish Constitution establishes that the Supreme Election Council (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu Başkanliği) shall execute all the functions for ensuring the fair and orderly conduct of elections from the beginning to the end of the electoral process, as well as carrying out any investigations and taking the final decision on all irregularities, complaints and objections concerning the elections during and after the polling, and verifying the election returns for the members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi). It also sets out that no appeal shall be made to any authority against the decisions of the Supreme Election Council. 205. There are cases of EDR systems entrusted to an independent EMB that are highly successful and credible, as in Costa Rica and Uruguay. These have become paradigms in their region by virtue of their respective normative frameworks and, above all, the performance and quality of their members. Both are examples of EDRSs in democracies that are not large and have adopted good practices. One factor contributing to their success is undoubtedly the deeply ingrained political culture in their societies, which are considered to be among those most committed to democratic principles and values in Latin America. The electoral courts in both countries have probably contributed to the development of that political culture during their many years of service. 206. Even so, the possible adoption of an EDR system entrusted to the EMB, with absolute judicial powers, should be considered very carefully in view of the potential for the abuse of such powers by independent bodies – especially when their decisions are not subject to appeal or to review. There may be more likelihood of abuses of power when a single authority is responsible for both running elections and adjudicating on disputes which arise out of these elections, and the EMB acts both as judge and challenged party in the same matter. The same argument is used to support moving jurisdiction over EDR systems from legislative bodies to judicial organs, insofar as a great many electoral disputes stem from challenges to the actions, procedures and decisions of the EMBs. 207. Nonetheless, the Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections (see box 5.1) regards an independent and impartial electoral commission as an acceptable body to determine complaints relating to the electoral process. 77 5. A general classification of EDR systems 203. In Latin America there is a growing interest in safeguarding elections from the influence of any external authority, especially from the three branches of government. Many consider that the best guarantee of free, fair and genuine elections is to keep all electoral matters, including the EDR system, under the responsibility of an independent and autonomous electoral authority – an independent EMB with judicial powers which directs the electoral process from beginning to end and resolves any challenges with rulings that are final.