Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
11
GINSBURG, J., dissenting
“As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress
may use any rational means to effectuate the constitu
tional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.” 383
U. S., at 324. Faced with subsequent reauthorizations of
the VRA, the Court has reaffirmed this standard. E.g.,
City of Rome, 446 U. S., at 178. Today’s Court does not
purport to alter settled precedent establishing that the
dispositive question is whether Congress has employed
“rational means.”
For three reasons, legislation reauthorizing an existing
statute is especially likely to satisfy the minimal require
ments of the rational-basis test. First, when reauthorization
is at issue, Congress has already assembled a legislative
record justifying the initial legislation. Congress is en
titled to consider that preexisting record as well as the
record before it at the time of the vote on reauthorization.
This is especially true where, as here, the Court has re
peatedly affirmed the statute’s constitutionality and Con
gress has adhered to the very model the Court has upheld.
See id., at 174 (“The appellants are asking us to do noth
ing less than overrule our decision in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach . . . , in which we upheld the constitutionality
of the Act.”); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U. S. 266, 283
(1999) (similar).
Second, the very fact that reauthorization is necessary
arises because Congress has built a temporal limitation
into the Act. It has pledged to review, after a span of
years (first 15, then 25) and in light of contemporary
evidence, the continued need for the VRA. Cf. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 343 (2003) (anticipating, but not
guaranteeing, that, in 25 years, “the use of racial prefer
ences [in higher education] will no longer be necessary”).
Third, a reviewing court should expect the record sup
porting reauthorization to be less stark than the record
originally made. Demand for a record of violations equiva
lent to the one earlier made would expose Congress to a