22
SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER
GINSBURG, J., dissenting
have been charged with rigidity had it afforded covered
jurisdictions no way out or ignored jurisdictions that
needed superintendence. Congress, however, responded to
this concern. Critical components of the congressional
design are the statutory provisions allowing jurisdictions
to “bail out” of preclearance, and for court-ordered “bail
ins.” See Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 199. The VRA
permits a jurisdiction to bail out by showing that it has
complied with the Act for ten years, and has engaged in
efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of vot
ers. 42 U. S. C. §1973b(a) (2006 ed. and Supp. V). It also
authorizes a court to subject a noncovered jurisdiction to
federal preclearance upon finding that violations of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments have occurred
there. §1973a(c) (2006 ed.).
Congress was satisfied that the VRA’s bailout mecha
nism provided an effective means of adjusting the VRA’s
coverage over time. H. R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 25 (the
success of bailout “illustrates that: (1) covered status is
neither permanent nor over-broad; and (2) covered status
has been and continues to be within the control of the
jurisdiction such that those jurisdictions that have a genu
inely clean record and want to terminate coverage have
the ability to do so”). Nearly 200 jurisdictions have suc
cessfully bailed out of the preclearance requirement, and
DOJ has consented to every bailout application filed by an
eligible jurisdiction since the current bailout procedure
became effective in 1984. Brief for Federal Respondent 54.
The bail-in mechanism has also worked. Several jurisdic
tions have been subject to federal preclearance by court
orders, including the States of New Mexico and Arkansas.
App. to Brief for Federal Respondent 1a–3a.
This experience exposes the inaccuracy of the Court’s
portrayal of the Act as static, unchanged since 1965.
Congress designed the VRA to be a dynamic statute, capa
ble of adjusting to changing conditions. True, many cov