Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013) 25 GINSBURG, J., dissenting neighbor Mississippi. 679 F. 3d, at 897 (Williams, J., dissenting). In other words, even while subject to the restraining effect of §5, Alabama was found to have “deni[ed] or abridge[d]” voting rights “on account of race or color” more frequently than nearly all other States in the Union. 42 U. S. C. §1973(a). This fact prompted the dissenting judge below to concede that “a more narrowly tailored coverage formula” capturing Alabama and a handful of other jurisdictions with an established track record of racial discrimination in voting “might be defensi­ ble.” 679 F. 3d, at 897 (opinion of Williams, J.). That is an understatement. Alabama’s sorry history of §2 violations alone provides sufficient justification for Congress’ deter­ mination in 2006 that the State should remain subject to §5’s preclearance requirement.7 A few examples suffice to demonstrate that, at least in Alabama, the “current burdens” imposed by §5’s preclear­ ance requirement are “justified by current needs.” Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 203. In the interim between the VRA’s 1982 and 2006 reauthorizations, this Court twice confronted purposeful racial discrimination in Alabama. In Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U. S. 462 (1987), the Court held that Pleasant Grove—a city in Jefferson County, Shelby County’s neighbor—engaged in purposeful discrimination by annexing all-white areas while rejecting the annexation request of an adjacent black neighborhood. The city had “shown unambiguous opposition to racial —————— 7 This lawsuit was filed by Shelby County, a political subdivision of Alabama, rather than by the State itself. Nevertheless, it is appropri­ ate to judge Shelby County’s constitutional challenge in light of in­ stances of discrimination statewide because Shelby County is subject to §5’s preclearance requirement by virtue of Alabama’s designation as a covered jurisdiction under §4(b) of the VRA. See ante, at 7. In any event, Shelby County’s recent record of employing an at-large electoral system tainted by intentional racial discrimination is by itself sufficient to justify subjecting the county to §5’s preclearance mandate. See infra, at 26.

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