TĂNASE v. MOLDOVA JUDGMENT 37 any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned ...” 157. Similarly, in Podkolzina v. Latvia (no. 46726/99, § 33, ECHR 2002-II), the Court observed that for the purposes of applying Article 3, any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned, so that features that would be unacceptable in the context of one system may be justified in the context of another. However, it emphasised that the State’s margin of appreciation in this regard was limited by the obligation to respect the fundamental principle of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, namely “the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see also Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 47, and Melnychenko v. Ukraine, no. 17707/02, § 55, ECHR 2004-X). 158. In assessing the limitations of the latitude afforded to States, the Court in Aziz (cited above, § 28) noted: “Although ... States enjoy considerable latitude to establish rules within their constitutional order governing parliamentary elections and the composition of the parliament, and ... the relevant criteria may vary according to the historical and political factors peculiar to each State, these rules should not be such as to exclude some persons or groups of persons from participating in the political life of the country and, in particular, in the choice of the legislature, a right guaranteed by both the Convention and the Constitutions of all Contracting States.” 159. Applying these principles, the Court considered in Ždanoka (cited above, §§ 119-35), that historical considerations could provide justification for restrictions on rights intended to protect the integrity of the democratic process by, in that case, excluding individuals who had actively participated in attempts to overthrow the newly established democratic regime. However, the Court suggested that such restrictions were unlikely to be compatible if they were still applied many years later, at a point where the justification for their application and the threats they sought to avoid were no longer relevant. Subsequently, in Ādamsons (cited above, §§ 123-28), the Court emphasised that with the passage of time, general restrictions on electoral rights become more difficult to justify. Instead, measures had to be “individualised” in order to address a real risk posed by an identified individual. 160. In Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) ([GC], no. 74025/01, § 62, ECHR 2005-IX), the Court observed more generally that any conditions imposed on the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage. 161. Finally, notwithstanding the wide margin of appreciation afforded to States in this area, the Court has reiterated on numerous occasions that it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of