equivalent Act, the two limbs of that provision are disjunctive and not conjunctive. They therefore urged the Court to depart from its interpretation of Section 83 of the Elections Act in the 2013 Raila Odinga case. They argued that despite the conjunctive nature of the English section, the same was given a disjunctive interpretation in the famous case of Morgan v. Simpson.8 [45] The first interested party supported the petitioners’ case on the interpretation of Section 83 of the Elections Act and urged that the provision should not be used to sanctify all manner of illegalities and irregularities which may occur during the electoral process so as to render them immaterial. [46] On the standard of proof to be applied, the petitioners submitted that this Court erred in the 2013 Raila Odinga case in holding that save where criminal allegations are made in a petition, the standard of proof in election cases is the intermediate one, above a balance of probabilities but below the one for criminal cases of beyond reasonable doubt. [47] Appreciating that the Court had reviewed several positions held by various jurisdictions in setting the standard of proof in the 2013 Raila Odinga case, the petitioners submitted that the emerging jurisprudence set out by the House of Lords in England is that in law, there exists only two standards of proof, the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt and the civil standard of balance of probabilities. They cited the case of Re B (Children)9 in support of that proposition. Morgan v. Simpson [1974] 3 All ER 722.  Re B (Children) 2008 UKHL 35.   8 9 Presidential  Petition  No.  1  of  2017                                                                                                                                                                                                            17  |  P a g e