of the civil standard of proof in respect of matters which are not criminal in nature on the basis that they are deemed as ‘serious matters’  is improper. In the circumstances, they urged the Court to find that the applicable standard of proof in the presidential election petitions is on a balance of probabilities. [138] In contrast, the 1st and 2nd respondents argued that the 2013 Raila Odinga case is good law. It was submitted that the burden of proof lies with the petitioners while the standard of proof is higher than that in civil cases where election malpractice is imputed. In that regard, the respondents relied on the Zambian case of Akashambatwa Lewanika & Others v. Fredrick Chiluba58, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj59 and the Nigerian Supreme Court’s decision in Buhari v. Obasanjo60. [139] For the 3rd respondent, relying on this Court’s decision in the 2013 Raila Odinga case and Amama Mbabazi case, it was submitted that save where allegation of commission of election offences are made in respect of which the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, the standard of proof in all other allegations is above the balance of probabilities but not beyond reasonable doubt. Counsel for the 3rd respondent dismissed the petitioners’ call for a review of this Court’s decision in the 2013 Raila Odinga case, arguing that the law as set out in that case, which this Court and other have applied in several subsequent cases, is still good law. Akashambatwa Lewanika & others v. Fredrick Chiluba (1999) 1 LRC 138. Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj 2012 SCC 55; (2012) 3 SCR 76. 60 Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) CLR 7K (SC). 58 59 Presidential  Petition  No.  1  of  2017                                                                                                                                                                                                            56  |  P a g e