of the Ecuadorian Constitution in force at that time). 123 94. Despite this, the six motions of censure that were presented against the judges were directly related to judgments that the Constitutional Tribunal had handed down; in particular, the decisions in the case of the “fourteenth salary” and the case of the “D’Hondt method.” This is illustrated by one of the motions of censure that requested impeachment supposedly because, in the decision on the “D’Hondt method,” there had been a presumed: Personal interest and to benefit those who had enabled their election to the Constitutional Tribunal […] prejudicing and placing at a disadvantage all the other political parties that exist in the country [and …] ignoring the formula for calculating proportional representation that permitted plural and democratic political representation [… based on which] they have jeopardized the next elections, with this dangerous attack on the democratic life of the country, as well as on the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution.124 95. As the Judgment notes,125 Ecuadorian law was sufficiently clear in the sense that the opinions given in the judgments delivered by the judges could not be grounds for their removal. The congressional records for December 1 and 8, 2004, allow it to be concluded that there was no mention of specific facts related to the supposed “serious offenses” committed by the judges; rather, reference was only made to their decisions, which were based on legal grounds and delivered within the framework of their competence. 96. Based on the above-mentioned reasons, legal grounds and factual evidence, it can be clearly understood that, in the Judgment, the Inter-American Court declared the respondent State internationally responsible for the violation of different rights established in Article 8(1) and (2), as well as in Article 8(4) (ne bis in idem),126 in relation to Article 1(1) 123 Cf. Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador of August 11, 1998. “Art. 275. The Constitutional Tribunal with national jurisdiction, shall have its seat in Quito. It shall be composed of nine members, who shall have their respective substitutes. They shall perform their functions for four years and may be re-elected. The organic law shall determine the rules for their organization and functioning, and the procedures for their actions.” “Art. 276.- The Constitutional Tribunal shall have competence: 1. To hear and decide appeals filed on the unconstitutionality, in substance or in form, of organic and ordinary laws, decree-laws, ordinances, statutes, regulations, and resolutions issued by organs of the institutions of the State, and to suspend all or some of their effects. 2. To hear and decide on the unconstitutionality of the administrative acts of all public authorities. The declaration of unconstitutionality shall result in the annulment of the act, without prejudice to the administrative organ adopting the necessary measures to preserve respect for the constitutional norms. 3. To examine decisions that deny habeas corpus, habeas corpus data, and amparo, and cases of appeal established in the action for amparo. 4. To rule on objections of unconstitutionality by the President of the Republic, in the law drafting process. 5. To rule on conformity with the Constitution, and international treaties and conventions prior to their approval by the National Congress. 6. To decide disputes concerning competence or attributes assigned by the Constitution. 7. To exercise the other attributes conferred on it by the Constitution and the laws. The decisions of the Judiciary shall not be susceptible to control by the Constitutional Tribunal 124 Cf. National Congress record, 24-326, session of December 1, 2004. 125 Para. 208 of the Judgment. The ICourtHR found that Article 8(4) of the Pact of San José had been violated, considering that, pursuant to domestic law, the impeachment proceedings held against the judges had concluded on December 1, 2004, and according to the explicit certification issued by the Secretariat of Congress that the motions of censured had been rejected because they had not obtained sufficient votes; because the “re-opening of the vote signified a new proceeding” in the session of Congress on December 8 that year. See, especially, paragraphs 184 to 186 of the Judgment. 126 25