process of law be applied in impeachment proceedings, but also the need for grounds for removal that are sufficiently clear must be considered included in the principle of legality, in order to avoid or prevent the risk of abusive interpretations. 155 And, as I have mentioned, this also encompasses – without any doubt, from my point of view – the guarantee of the criminalization of all offenses of legal and public significance. The second argument to affirm that the institution of impeachment must be subsumed in Article 9 of the Pact of San José relates to what I have explained previously: granting Congress such broad and important powers as the removal of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal can only be compatible with the necessary constitutional checks and balance, if it is exercised based on specific grounds considered as a mechanism of protection against the attempts of the National Congress to resort to interpretations that consist in an abuse of power, that exceeds the admissible limits of the interpretation of the law (in this regard see, supra para. 15). 116. In other words, in order to be in conformity with the American Convention, the criteria for impeaching judges or members of the Constitutional Tribunal should have been clear and explicit. Hence, the connection between the separation of powers, judicial independence, and the principle of legality is fundamental in order to bring the mechanism of the impeachment of judges into line with what should be its only acceptable configuration under the Convention: that of an eventual non-arbitrary sanction, to be applied with the guarantees consubstantial with the rule of law, as required also by Article 3 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter (see supra para. 13).156 117. In this regard, the ICourtHR has considered that the principle of legality entails a clear definition of criminal conduct, which establishes its elements, and allows it to be distinguished from non-punishable conduct or unlawful conduct punishable with noncriminal measures. Ambiguity in the definition of disciplinary or criminal offenses gives rise to doubts and opens the way to the discretion of the authority, which is particularly undesirable when establishing the criminal responsibility of the individual and sanctioning this with penalties that have a severe impact on fundamental rights, such as life or the factors that distinguish it from other forms of conduct that are either not punishable or punishable with noncriminal measures. The American Convention requires States to make every effort to apply criminal sanctions with strict respect for the basic rights of the individual, after carefully ascertaining the actual existence of illegal conduct. In this regard, it is incumbent on the criminal judge, when applying criminal law, to abide strictly by its provisions and to be extremely rigorous when relating the conduct of the accused to the definition of the offense, in order not to punish acts that are not punishable under the legal system”; Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru. Judgment of November 25, 2005. Series C No. 137, paras. 188 to 190. See also Case of Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 20, 2005. Series C No. 126, para. 90; Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2004. Series C No. 119, para. 125; Case of De la Cruz Flores v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 18, 2004. Series C No. 115, paras. 79, 81 and 82, and Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, para. 106. In this regard, the ICourtHR has indicated that “administrative sanctions are, like criminal sanctions, an expression of the State’s punitive power and, at times, they are similar to these in nature. They both entail impairment, deprivation or alteration of the rights of the individual, as a result of an unlawful conduct. Therefore, in a democratic system it is necessary to take maximum care to ensure that the said measures are adopted strictly respecting the basic rights of the individual and following a careful verification that the unlawful conduct actually existed”; Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, para. 106. 155 This article establishes that essential elements of representative democracy are respect for human rights, access to and “the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, […] and the separation of powers and independence of the branches of government.” 156 32