Chapter 5 At 446 (emphasis supplied). The last hurdle facing the Wisconsin Supreme Court was what it called the “outcome rule.” This principle, which we have encountered in several cases, says that if the outcome of the election would not be changed by the irregularities, the election should not be voided. As to this rule the supreme court said, We agree with these statements as they apply to most cases of election irregularities. But in a case where deprivations of the right to vote are so significant in number or so egregious in character as to seriously undermine the appearance of fairness, we hold such an election must be set aside, even where the outcome of the election might not be changed. At 447-448 (emphasis supplied). Finally, the supreme court noted that fraud was not involved in the case and that even though voiding an election is a serious undertaking, this particular election did not affect the occupant of an elective office. Instead, at 446, the supreme court viewed the status quo in Burnett County as having been preserved “as it has been for more than one hundred years,” and if the people in the county really wanted to move the county seat, they could do so in a referendum election in which everyone could vote. McNally is a good example of a case where the application of the standard principles of election dispute resolution did not resolve the problem that the facts presented. It describes how a court, facing those circumstances, can find an overarching principle that fits the facts and remedies the problem without disturbing the traditional principles of election dispute resolution. In other words, it is possible to apply remedies beyond those dictated by the traditional principles of election dispute resolution when fairness demands that extraordinary steps be taken to cure the irregularities that occurred. Is there a danger that this approach could lead to court decisions that are based on subjective impressions rather than decisions that follow the rules and are bound by precedent? This is always a danger when a court uses its equity powers to right a wrong. But the legal system has built-in procedures for dealing with overreaching. When a lower court oversteps the bounds of its equity power, the corrective action comes in the appeal process. When a state supreme court seems to overstep those bounds, the corrective action comes in later decisions that overrule the precedent or restrict it to the particular facts of that case. Remember, for example, George v. Municipal Election Commission of the City of Charleston, 516 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. 1999), and Taylor v. Town of Atlantic Beach Election Commission, 609 S.E.2d 500 (S.C. 2005), as those cases were discussed in Chapter 3. In both cases, the South Carolina Supreme Court found that voters did not cast their ballots in secret. In George, where the secrecy of the ballot was wholly absent, the supreme court found that the secrecy requirement was mandatory and the election was voided. Six years later in Taylor, where the secrecy of the ballot was absent in particular instances for some of the voters, the South Carolina Supreme Court found that the secrecy requirement was directory and the election was upheld. The South Carolina Supreme Court explained that the differences in the results of the two cases flowed from the differences in their facts. But it is more likely that the South Carolina Supreme Court used Taylor (2005) to rein in its use of its equity power in George (1999) when it said that the ballot secrecy requirements were mandatory. While there was some difference in the facts of the two cases, there was no proven intrusion on the secrecy of any particular voter’s vote in George—the facts do not show that voters 113