The Resolution of Election Disputes: Legal Principles that Control Election Challenges The power of this court stems not from legislation but from fundamental law…In the exercise of that constitutional authority—known as our “general supervision control” over all courts and administrative agencies—this court is empowered to re-examine the correctness of any board ruling on an issue of law which may affect the ultimate outcome of an election. At 1335 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). The supreme court said that the lower court judge was wrong when he read the state statute as prohibiting him from reviewing the election board’s decision about those two odd ballot marks. Once the supreme court decided that the board’s decision could be reviewed, the supreme court went ahead and reviewed the marks, i.e., the supreme court analyzed the evidence to determine whether the electoral board’s decision was correct under the law. As in Keating, the court in Boevers decided that the board had made the wrong decision under the law: the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that the marks on the two ballots were not improper and, therefore, Mr. Boevers and not Mr. Kremeier won the nomination. E. The limitations on the scope of review are universally applied. The above cases are a few of the many cases in this book in which the scope of review is mentioned and often is determinative. A brief set of quotations from some of the other cases already discussed in this book will give a sense of the universal importance with which the courts treat the limitations on their scope of review. • • • • • 128 “In municipal election cases, this Court reviews the judgment of the circuit court upholding or overturning the decision of a municipal election commission only to correct errors of law. The review does not extend to findings of fact unless those findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence.” George v. Municipal Election Commission of the City of Charleston, 516 S.E.2d 206, 208 (S.C. 1999), citing Knight, among other cases. “This Court is bound by the trial court’s findings of fact unless those findings are not based on competent evidence.” In re General Election for District Justice, 670 A.2d 629, 637 (Pa. 1996), and after remand, 695 A.2d 476 (1997). “A court of appeal may not set aside a finding of fact by a trial court in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong, and where there is a conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed on review…” Nugent v. Phelps, 816 So.2d 349, 359 (La. Ct. App. 2002). “[The trial court’s] judgment based upon that testimony is presumed correct and will be reversed only if, after consideration of the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, the judgment is found to be plainly and palpably wrong.” Blocker v. City of Roosevelt City, 549 So.2d 90, 91 (Ala. 1989). “In respect to issues three and four, we conclude from our review of the record that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the final judgment with respect to those issues. We therefore affirm the final judgment as to those issues but do not find that they merit discussion.” Beckstrom v. Volusia County, 707 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1998).