Barber v. Edgar 294 A.2d 453. 294 A.2d 453 (Cite as: 294 A.2d 453) Page 4 electorate as it has been objectively manifested in votes which have been actually case. These policy considerations dictate that the objective results of elections conducted to actual completion, in accordance with legal directives prescribed for the procedural course of the election and the tabulation of its outcome, shall be accorded, rather than denied maximum possible legal effectiveness-so long as a Court may allow such legal effectiveness on a rational basis consistent with the realities of general experience and avoiding speculation concerning the subjective intentions of those who voted. [3] It is in light of this public policy that the overwhelming weight of authority in the United States has developed the principle that a person's ineligibility to take, or hold, office will not be permitted to vitiate absolutely and totally the legal effectiveness of the votes actually cast for him in a lawfully conducted election. Such votes, as was said in Heald v. Payson, 110 Me. 204, 85 A. 576 (1913): '. . . are at least so far effectual as to prevent the election of a candidate who received a less number of votes.' (p. 206, 85 A. p. 576) In Patton v. Haselton, 164 Iowa 645, 146 N.W. 477 (1914) the Court recognized as 'quite uniformly held' (p. 478) the principle that should there be a majority vote for a candidate who might become ineligible to hold office before the election is completed '. . . such majority vote is effective as an expression of the will of the voters, . . . sufficient to negative a claim of election as against the minority candidate.' (p. 479) The Iowa Court stressed the irrationality, because of the high degree of conjecture and speculation involved, of any legal presumption that a voter, even if he knowingly votes for an ineligible candidate, intends *457 that his vote should be entirely without legal effect-that he is deliberately throwing away his vote. accurate reflection of the great preponderance of American authority in support of the general principle above stated. The principle is further enunciated in Murtagh v. Registrar of Voters of Peabody, 340 Mass. 737, 166 N.E.2d 702 (1960), in a statement qualifying the reasoning of Madden v. Board of Election Com'rs., 251 Mass. 95, 146 N.E. 280 (1925), even as it was applied to the special circumstances in Madden which are significantly distinguishable from the specific situation now before us. In Murtagh the Court said of some of the reasoning of Madden, that it '. . . is contrary to the great preponderance of American authority . . .' and, further '. . . it fails to give proper weight to the negative value of a vote for the dead man.' (166 N.E.2d p. 704) [4] On the facts established before us the conclusion is inescapable that there were 11,710 valid votes cast for the office of Sheriff of Androscoggin County at the June 19, 1972, Primary Election. Plaintiff Barber failed to receive a plurality of these votes. His claim that he was elected must fail. We declare that, plaintiff, Robert Barber, was not the duly nominated candidate of the Democratic Party for the office of Sheriff of Androscoggin County at the June 19, 1972, Primary Election. Accordingly, other prayers of the Complaint are denied. DUFRESNE, C. J., did not sit. 294 A.2d 453 END OF DOCUMENT See: State ex rel. Sheets v. Speidel, 62 Ohio St. 156, 56 N.E. 871 (1900). See the cases collected in the note in 133 A.L.R. 319 as an © 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 143