The Resolution of Election Disputes: Legal Principles that Control Election Challenges tertain election contests, i.e., they have jurisdiction, only where the statute governing the procedures for election contests have been satisfied. If the final canvass was made by the State Board of Elections, Ms. Pullen’s petition was filed on time. If the final canvass was the one made by the county canvassing board, Ms. Pullen’s petition was filed too late. To determine which board made the final canvass of returns in the manner dictated by the statute, the Illinois Supreme Court began by saying, Courts have no inherent power to hear election contests, but may do so only when authorized by statute and in the manner dictated by statute. At 589. The supreme court then provided an overview of the relevant provisions of the state election code. Various provisions mentioned the canvasses conducted by each of the two boards, when they were to be conducted and what happened after they were conducted. Ms. Pullen argued that the state board’s canvass was the final one, and Ms. Mulligan argued that the canvass was completed by the county board.5 Both candidates relied on decisions of Illinois courts from earlier cases. After examining the court decisions that each candidate relied on, the statutes themselves and definitions in Webster’s Dictionary, the supreme court, at the end of its seven-page discussion, concluded that under the “clear” language of the statute it is the State Board of Elections that made the final canvass of returns. Accordingly, Ms. Pullen was found to have filed her petition in time to contest the election and the Supreme Court moved on to consider which ballots should have been counted, and which ballots should not have been counted. The question of which ballots to count and which ballots not to count will be discussed in Chapter 3 when we consider the difference between mandatory and directory statutory words. For now, it is clear that no matter how badly Penny Pullen thought she had been treated by poll workers during the election or during the vote count, or by the decisions of the county and state boards of canvassers or the trial court, no court could hear her complaints unless she first satisfied the procedural requirements for filing her complaints under the state’s election laws.6 B.4. Identify procedural defects: Fundamental v. technical James Logic was not as astute as Penny Pullen. He had run for mayor of South Milwaukee, Wisconsin, against David Kieck, the incumbent, in an April 6, 2004 election. The election resulted in a tie. Mayor Kieck requested that the board of canvassers conduct a recount, which they did, and Mayor Kieck was reelected by one vote. Mr. Logic filed a lawsuit claiming that the board of canvassers erred in the recount. Logic v. City of South Milwaukee Board of Canvassers, 689 N.W.2d 692 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). The controlling state statute said that a candidate could appeal a decision of the board of canvassers to the circuit court within five days of the board’s decision “by serving a written notice of appeal on the Ms. Mulligan argued that because the district in which she and Ms. Pullen were running (the 55th Representative District) was wholly inside Cook County, the state board did not have anything to canvass after the county board finished its work, and its only job was to proclaim a winner once it got the statement of returns from the county canvassing board. 6 Another example of a filing deadline being central to the jurisdiction of the court is Keating v. Iozzo, 508 N.E.2d 503 (Ill.App. 1987), which will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6. In Keating, the court said, “…Mieszcak’s motion raised the question of jurisdiction which may be raised at any time. If the Board lacked jurisdiction over the objections to Mieszcak’s nominating papers on the basis of untimeliness, it also lacked jurisdiction over the other objections which were filed at the same time. Thus, none of the petitioners are barred from raising the timeliness issue on appeal.” At 505. 5 6