The Resolution of Election Disputes: Legal Principles that Control Election Challenges 508 N.E.2d 503 155 Ill.App.3d 774, 508 N.E.2d 503, 108 Ill.Dec. 342 (Cite as: 155 Ill.App.3d 774, 508 N.E.2d 503, 108 Ill.Dec. 342) that the candidates were informed as to when she would be there. Moreover, Iozzo did not tell the clerk that the hours she specified were not adequate time for him to file. At no point did he assert that he was unable to file while the clerk was present. Since the objector had an opportunity to file, albeit a limited opportunity, it cannot be said that he was required to do something which could not be done. The issue in John Allen Co. v. Sesser Concrete Products Co. (1969), 114 Ill.App.2d 186, 252 N.E.2d 361, was whether the period for redemption of real estate sold for delinquent taxes should be extended despite the fact that the county clerk's office was open from 8 a.m. until noon on the last day for redemption. The final day to redeem fell on a Saturday but the redemption fees were not paid until the following Monday. The Sesser court cited Pettigrove and Burgess and then looked to the statutory provisions for the office hours of county clerks. Under the statute the subject clerk's office was to be closed on Saturday unless the county board properly passed a resolution to the contrary. No *779 such resolution had been passed. Nevetheless, the county clerk's office was open on that Saturday from 8 a.m. until 12 noon. The court found that, under the statute, the clerk could lawfully have closed the office at any time before noon or even never have opened it at all on the day in question. The court concluded that, even though the office was open, it was not open under any legal requirement which would give notice that redemption fees could be paid on that date. The redemption period was extended to Monday. While Sesser also involved a final date which fell on Saturday, it differs from Pettigrove and Burgess in that the office of the county clerk in Sesser was subject to a statute which became a pivotal factor in the court's opinion. The statute did not **507 ***346 require the office to be open on Saturday. On the contrary, it provided for the office to be closed unless the county board resolved otherwise. Thus, the fact that the office was actually open was irrelevant. The redeeming party had no notice that the office would be open to accept redemption fees and could not be bound by a final date falling on a Saturday. The case at bar differs from Sesser on the matter of notice. Iozzo does not contest that he received notice directly from the clerk as to when she would 310 Page 4 be in her office to accept objections. Mierswa v. Kusper (1984), 121 Ill.App.3d 430, 77 Ill.Dec. 14, 459 N.E.2d 1110, a case cited by petitioners, was an appeal from denial of a petition for mandamus which sought to force the convening of the Cook County electoral board to hear an objection to nominating papers. The objection had allegedly been untimely filed where the last day for filing was a Saturday and plaintiff did not file until the first possible day the next week. Plaintiff insisted the case was controlled by a statute which provided that, as a general rule, Saturdays should be excluded from the computation of statutory time periods when the last day falls on a Saturday. The court, however, decided that the statutory timetable for filing nominations and objections for the particular office relevant in the case showed an intentional legislative design that Saturday should be the last day for filing since the last day would always be a Saturday. The court refused to apply the general provision for excluding Saturday. Since the statutory timetable analyzed in Mierswa is not the same as the one pertinent to the case now before us, the primary holding of that case is not relevant here. However, review of the facts and the Mierswa court's discussion of other arguments offered by plaintiff is enlightening. The clerk's office in Mierswa was mandated by statute to be open from 9 a.m. to noon on Saturdays. Plaintiff stipulated that the office had actually been open until 5 p.m. on the day in question. *780 On these facts plaintiff made two very similar arguments. First, she claimed that holding Saturday as the last day for filing would work an injustice by allowing the actual time for filing to vary at the discretion of the county clerk. Plaintiff cited John Allen Co. v. Sesser Concrete Products Co. (1969), 114 Ill.App.2d 186, 252 N.E.2d 361, in support of her further argument that since the office could have been closed after noon and she could have been prevented from filing on time, holding Saturday as the last day resulted in insufficient notice to the public of the last day to file. The court responded to plaintiff's first argument by noting that she did not argue that she could not have filed her objections on Saturday and that she stipulated that the office was open until 5 p.m. that day. The issue was then resolved on the basis that the office was open Saturday morning pur- © 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.