Chapter 2 resealed and locked in the tabulation room to which three people had keys. The results of later recounts were substantially the same as the first recount. More than two months after the election, Mr. Zupsic filed an election contest. The trial court found that sometime between November 2 and January 5, somebody opened the ballot boxes and marked enough ballots to change the election result in Ms. Laughlin’s favor. Ballots that had been marked for Mr. Zupsic were later marked for Ms. Laughlin as well, causing those ballots to be “overvoted” and rejected (because they had more than one candidate marked for an office for which only one person was to be elected), giving Mr. Zupsic fewer votes than he had initially. Conversely, ballots that originally had no vote for a candidate in the judge’s contest (“undervoted”) later were marked for Ms. Laughlin, giving her more votes than she had initially. Most of the differences between the first vote count and the recounts came from five precincts and existed only in the Zupsic-Laughlin contest (votes for candidates in other contests were unchanged). The trial court found that there was no way to determine exactly how many ballots were altered, but it allowed into evidence testimony from five voters who said they could identify which of the ballots were theirs, because those voters had put their own names on the ballots as write-in candidates for various offices. Each of the five ballots had a vote marked for Ms. Laughlin, and each of the voters said he or she did not put it there. Ms. Laughlin lost the case and appealed the decision. On appeal, one of Ms. Laughlin’s arguments was that the trial court was wrong to admit the testimony of the five voters because a voter may not waive his or her right to the secrecy of the ballot. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the sound public policy reasons for maintaining the secrecy of the ballot and for refusing to “‘abandon the keystone of our democracy—the secrecy of the ballot, on the pretense of discovering an error in the return.’” 670 A.2d at 639, quoting Judge Woodside in Thomas A. Crowley Election Contest, 57 Dauphin Co. Rep. 120 (Pa. 1945). But the supreme court then quoted Judge Woodside further to say, “‘…[W]e are not prepared to state nor called upon to say that there are no circumstances under which a legal voter will be permitted to take the witness stand on his own circumstances and testify how he voted…’” 670 A.2d at 639. However, in the Crowley case, Judge Woodside concluded that where there was no fraud and one could determine what the vote was from the ballots themselves, oral testimony by the voter as to how he or she voted should not be accepted. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then noted that Mr. Zupsic’s case involved a finding that fraud occurred in some of the ballots and determined that those five voters’ testimony as to the content of their ballots was properly allowed into evidence: We agree with the lower court that, under the unusual circumstances of this case, the sanctity of the ballot is not best preserved by secrecy, but instead by allowing those whose legitimate votes were altered through no fault of their own to testify, if they so choose, regarding how they originally voted. Therefore, we hold that, under these limited circumstances, where a vote has been properly cast but subsequently altered through no fault of the voter, the voter should be allowed to voluntarily appear and testify regarding how he or she originally voted. 670 A.2d at 639. When the ballot is illegal because of the voter’s action, however, the courts are less reluctant to have them testify about how they voted. This is what happened in Green v. Reyes, 836 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. App. Houston 1992), where Ben Reyes (a Houston, Texas, city councilman) challenged the apparent nomination, 45