The Resolution of Election Disputes: Legal Principles that Control Election Challenges Raymond Taylor and other opponents of the measure requested and got a recount. The recount board concluded that the ballot-reading machine did not properly read four ballots. On one of the four ballots the voter had completely darkened the word “No,” but did not fill in the oval next to the word “No.” On the other three ballots the voters had darkened-in the letter O in the word “NO,” but left the oval next to the word “No” empty. The board decided that the three ballots with the O filled in showed the voters’ intent to vote against the measure, and should be counted, but that the voter’s intent was unclear on the ballot with the word “No” overwritten, and that ballot should not be counted. As a result, only 59.89% of the votes were cast for the measure and it failed. A three-member contest court, convened under Iowa law at the request of 28 other voters, decided that none of the four “No” ballots should be counted.71 The measure passed. Mr. Taylor and two other voters filed a petition in Iowa district court to try to reverse the recount court’s decision. The district court decided that because the voters of the four ballots had not marked inside the ovals, their intent could not be shown and all four ballots were rejected. The measure passed. The case was appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court. First the supreme court closely read the statute allowing an appeal from the recount court to the district court. The statute “permits a ‘party against whom judgment [was] rendered [to] appeal within twenty days to the district court.’” At 658. But Mr. Taylor and his group had not filed an appeal to the district court from the recount court—they filed a petition in the district court. The supreme court noted that, “The right to contest an election is only conferred by statute, and contestants must strictly comply with the provisions of the statute in order to confer jurisdiction.” At 657. Still, the supreme court went on to say, In the same way as we strive to uphold those legislative requirements written into the statute through strict compliance, we must not defeat the legislative process by imposing requirements where none exist…It is clear that Taylor invoked the jurisdiction of the district court for the purpose of appealing the decision of the contest court. Taylor did not commence an independent action to dispute the results of the election. Instead, he properly commenced the action through a contest court, and his petition in district court indicated he was pursuing the matter as an appeal “pursuant to” [the applicable statute] and in doing so he asked the court to reverse the decision of the contest court. Under the circumstances, we find the filing of this petition was sufficient to meet the statutory requirements for making an appeal. It looked like that the supreme court was ready to apply the substantial compliance test to the four ballots that were being contested. But that was not the way it turned out. The supreme court defined the issue by saying, There is no claim that the form or content of the ballot in this case did not conform to our statutory requirements…Instead, the question is whether the voting mark on the disputed ballots complied with the requirements of our statutes. [State law] requires the voter to “designate a vote by making the appropriate mark in the voting target.” At 659. One member of the recount court was chosen by the petitioners, one member was chosen by the county commissioner of elections, and one member was chosen jointly by both the petitioners and the commissioner. I.C.A. § 57.7 (2003). 71 78