Unfair Advantage: The Abuse of State Resources in Elections between the agencies.”143 Alternatively, it may be possible to design an effective system characterized by “institutional multiplicity,” in which competing jurisdictions are enabled by “more than one institution [being] charged with performing a certain function.”144 As the International Research Initiative on Brazil and Africa has noted, however, it is important to create a structure where the competing jurisdictions creates incentives to improve performance, rather than providing an option for institutions to shirk their responsibilities.145 Sri Lanka offers an instructive example of problematic lines of authority in oversight. Despite a legal framework that regulates the use of state resources and an Election Commission that has proven willing to take on the issue in Sri Lanka, the misuse of incumbency during election campaigns has become ubiquitous.146 The Election Commission’s insufficient resources, coupled with the unwillingness of other oversight actors to proactively pursue their enforcement mandates, has created an environment that emboldens perpetrators to violate the law without fear of retribution.147 The overlapping and blurred jurisdiction of several oversight bodies with mandates to combat the abuse of state resources – including the Election Commission, Permanent Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption, Attorney-General, and the police – further encourages weak enforcement. In contrast, the Brazilian system of oversight is characterized by institutional multiplicity,148 with several institutions having a role in monitoring (the Federal Accounting Tribunal [TCU] and the Office of the Comptroller General), investigating (the Federal Public Prosecutors’ Office and the Federal Police), and applying penalties (administrative bodies and the judiciary) to those involved in corruption, including the abuse of state resources.149 Unlike in Sri Lanka where there are problematic lines of oversight, some researchers have noted that this institutional multiplicity appears to facilitate increased monitoring and investigation of corruption.150 However, they also noted that it has led to a hindrance of punishment, as the judicial system does not effectively or efficiently punish offenders.151 The 2015 general election in Nigeria offers a third illustrative case: violations of campaign regulations, including the misuse of state resources highlighted in this paper, went unaddressed during the election campaign according to election observers. The EU EOM noted that the Independent National Electoral Commission’s lack of sanctioning power and the accompanying lack of monitoring and sanctioning tools available to stakeholders “amplified the widespread sense of electoral impunity.”152 Countries have adopted various approaches to monitoring, receiving and investigating complaints as well as making Id. Mariana Mota Prado & Lindsey Carson, Brazilian Anti-Corruption Legislation and its Enforcement: Potential Lessons for Institutional Design 8 (International Research Initiative on Brazil and Africa (IRIBA), Working Paper No. 09, 2014) [hereinafter Mariana Mota Prado & Lindsey Carson, Working Paper 09]. 143 144 145 See id. Provisions in the legal framework targeting the abuse of state resources include: Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Constitution May 15, 2015, art. 104B (4)(a) (Sri Lanka); Establishment Code c. XXXII (2013) (Sri Lanka); The Bribery (Amendment) Act, No. 12 of 1994 § 70 (Sri Lanka); and the Offences Against Public Property Act, No. 12 of 1982 (Sri Lanka). In 2015, the Department of Elections (now the Election Commission) took several actions aimed at addressing the abuse of state resources, including issuing repeated instructions to the police and distributing a circular defining “moveable and immovable property” that are recognized as state resources that should not be used during the campaign. See Transparency Int’l, Sri Lanka Electoral Integrity Report, supra note 48, at 14-15. 147 For example, no violators have been tried under criminal provisions in the last five years. See id. at 8. 148 See Mariana Mota Prado & Linsey Carson, Working Paper No. 09, supra note 144. 149 See id. at 10. 150 See id. 151 See id. 152 See EU EOM Nigeria Final Report, supra note 54, at 20. 146 19