THE GEORGIAN LABOUR PARTY v. GEORGIA JUDGMENT 33 threatened and instructed not to write complaints about violations observed, namely when votes cast in its favour were attributed by the presidential majority of electoral commissions to the presidential party. Other examples of abuses could be read into the 28 March 2004 EOM Report (see paragraph 50 above). 99. The composition of the electoral commissions at the time of the repeat parliamentary election was not, in the applicant party’s view, independent and impartial and thus contravened Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. 3. The Court’s assessment 100. The Court has often underlined the necessity to maintain the political neutrality of those civil servants, judges and other persons in State service who exercise public authority, so as to ensure that all citizens receive equal and fair treatment that is not vitiated by political considerations (see Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, §§ 41 and 46, ECHR 1999-III; Briķe v. Latvia (dec.), no. 47135/99, 29 June 2000; and Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, § 58, Series A no. 323). 101. As a corollary to the above principle, and recalling that the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are crucial to establishing and preserving the foundations of a meaningful democracy (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 47, Series A no. 113), the Court finds it particularly important for an agency in charge of electoral administration to function in a transparent manner and to maintain impartiality and independence from political manipulation. 102. The Court notes that the applicant party’s complaint is mostly based on the arguments that the composition of and decision-making process within the electoral commissions as such amounted to a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. 103. Having examined the relevant electoral legislation of several Contracting States, the Court comes to the conclusion that there is no uniform system for the composition and functioning of electoral administrative bodies in Europe (see paragraphs 58-69 above). There is a diversity of possible choices in this area. Those choices vary in accordance with the historical and political factors specific to each State. The Court therefore considers that the Contracting States should indeed be granted a margin of appreciation in the sphere of organising their electoral administrations, as long as the chosen system provides for conditions which ensure the “free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of their legislature” (see, mutatis mutandis, Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 33, ECHR 2002-II). 104. However, while recognising the respondent State’s latitude in organising its electoral administration, the Court must establish whether there were any specific acts of the electoral commissions which marred the applicant party’s right to stand in the repeat parliamentary election of