THE GEORGIAN LABOUR PARTY v. GEORGIA JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS 49 PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MULARONI I am in full agreement with the majority as to the reasoning and the conclusions concerning the applicant party’s victim status and the first complaint raised by it, namely the voter registration system. Consequently, this opinion addresses the two other complaints, namely the composition of the electoral commissions and the exclusion of the Khulo and Kobuleti electoral districts from the countrywide vote tally. A. Composition of the electoral commissions As the majority recognises, there is no uniform system for the composition and functioning of electoral administrative bodies in Europe (see paragraphs 58-69 and 103 of the judgment). Accordingly, Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in this field, so long as the selected system does not hinder the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. The crucial element for the Court’s assessment is, consequently, whether or not the shortcomings found are significant enough to amount to a breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. Like the majority, I observe that the total number of members of the electoral commissions who were to be appointed by the President of Georgia was particularly high in comparison to other legal orders in Europe (see paragraphs 105-06 of the judgment). However, this element alone would not suffice for me to find a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, since: – members appointed by the President of Georgia did not represent the majority inside the commissions; and – I consider that the Court’s task is to examine the specific circumstances of the individual case lodged with the Court, and not the theoretical issues. Having said that, unlike the majority I consider that there was a breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in the present case. I do not share the view that the applicant party’s reference to the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report on the Repeat Parliamentary Election of 28 March 2004 (see paragraphs 50-53 of the judgment) was insufficient. That Report, which was submitted by the Government as part of their observations, contains, inter alia, the following passages: “The CEC [the Central Electoral Commission] administered these elections in a credible and professional manner. However, at times the CEC appeared to exceed its authority, for example, by extending legal deadlines or modifying other legal provisions through decrees. Several aspects of the election process were improved over previous elections, although some CEC decisions in the post-election period cast doubts about its impartiality ...