692 AFRICAN COURT LAW REPORT VOLUME 1 (2006-2016) functions incompatible with this independence, such as “holding political, diplomatic or administrative positions or function as government legal adviser at the national level”. The independence of Members of the Court is, however, a necessary but not sufficient condition. Every judge must also be impartial, that is, not biased, prejudiced or with conflict of interest; reason for which Rule 8(4) of the Rules prohibits him from sitting in cases where there may be a conflict 15 of interest of a personal, material or other nature.15 17. As regards the independence of a body in general, the European Court of Human Rights as far back as 1984 synthesized its case-law on the subject in the following terms: “In determining whether a body can be considered to be “independent” notably of the executive and of the parties…the Court has had regard to the manner of appointment of its members and the duration of their term of office …the existence of guarantees against outside pressures… and the 16 question whether the body presents an appearance of independence…”16 18. In its judgment of 25 February 1997 in the case of Findlay v the United Kingdom, the European Court recalled the foregoing criteria in its assessment of the independence of a judicial body. On that occasion, it made a clear distinction between this notion of independence and that of impartiality: “The Court recalls that in order to establish whether a tribunal can be considered as ‘independent’, regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence. As to the question of ‘impartiality’, there are two aspects to this requirement. First, the tribunal must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias. Secondly, it must also be impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is, it must offer sufficient 17 guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.”17 19. In the judicial field, the distinction between the two concepts of independence and impartiality was further emphasized by the 18 In the quasi-judicial Bengalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002).18 realm, the same distinction has been made by the Guiding Principles on the Independence and Impartiality of UN Human Rights Treaty Body 19 In the area of arbitration, the distinction between Members (2012).19 15 For example, no member of the Court may participate in the examination of a case “if he has a personal interest in the case”, in particular because of conjugal or parental relationship with one of the parties, or “if he has expressed in public, through the media, in writing, by public actions or by any other means, opinions which are objectively of such a nature as to impair his impartiality”. 16 Case of Campbell and Fell v the United Kingdom, Application No.7819/77; 7878/77, Judgment of 28 June 1984, paragraph 78. 17 Case of Campbell and Fell v the United Kingdom, Application No 7819/77; 7878/77, Opinion of 28 June 1984, paragraph 73. 18 Bangalore Draft Code of Judicial Conduct 2001 adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity and revised at the Roundtable Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 25 and 26 November 2002. 19 The said Guiding Principles were adopted in 2012 by the Chairs of the United Nations treaty bodies, who recommended their adoption by the various treaty bodies, including by incorporating them into their rules of procedure.