This is r 19(1) of the 1960 Rules, which reads as follows: Any period of time prescribed by rules 5, 6 or 7 shall be computed in accordance with section 119 of the Act and shall not be enlarged by order or otherwise, but save as aforesaid rules 2.8 to 2.11 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 shall apply to any period of time prescribed by these Rules as if it were prescribed by the Civil Procedure Rules. [emphasis added] 39 However, what is significant in the context of the present proceedings is that, notwithstanding the clear provisions of r 19(1) as reproduced above, the court in Ahmed v Kennedy nevertheless endorsed decisions such as the Devan Nair case, despite acknowledging (at [36]) that there was no equivalent of r 19(1) in those decisions. General principle 40 Mr Chan also canvassed several arguments which were premised on general principle – many of which were (as I have already mentioned) in fact related to (and even arose out of) the cases he relied on, and which have been referred to in the preceding part of this judgment. 41 Firstly, he pointed to the fact that every challenge mounted by every plaintiff must comply with all the timelines laid down in the PER strictly (including that contained in r 13) in order for there to be the requisite certainty. This argument, in fact, overlaps completely with the reasoning of the courts in several cases which have been referred to in the preceding part of this judgment. In other words, there is the need for the speedy determination of any controversy concerning election results. 42 Secondly, and in a related vein, he argued that if the timelines laid down in the PER were not mandatory and extensions of time were (as a consequence) possible, it would not be possible to draw the line and undesirable uncertainty would result once more. 43 Thirdly (and, once again, in a related vein), Mr Chan argued that, in any event, the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) were not applicable. In response to a possible argument that r 3 of the PER could in fact introduce the Rules of Court (and, hence, the further possible argument to the effect that the time under r 13 could be extended), he responded by relying upon O 1 r 2(4) of the Rules of Court, which excluded the application of the Rules of Court in the context of the Act and the PER. On the other hand, and in order to explain r 3 of the PER, Mr Chan argued that this particular rule (ie, r 3) referred to the entire Rules of Court which, in turn, stated (specifically, in O 1 r 2(4)) that the Rules of Court were not applicable, except in the limited circumstances stated therein (at the right-most column in O 1 r 2(4) of the Rules of Court themselves: see below at [45]). Indeed, the precise relationship between O 1 r 2(4) of the Rules of Court on the one hand and r 3 of the PER on the other is, in my view, far from clear. In the circumstances, I shall have occasion to return to this relationship once again – if nothing else, because (as we shall see below) Mr Ravi (not surprisingly) argued the precise opposite. In particular, he (Mr Ravi) argued that r 3 of the PER indeed introduces the provisions of the Rules of Court and that, therefore, the time under r 13 can, and ought to be extended by recourse to O 3 r 4 of the Rules of Court (see [56] below). 44 It would be appropriate at this juncture to set out the relevant provisions. First, r 3 of the PER reads as follows: Application of Rules of Court 3 . Subject to the provisions of these Rules and of the Act, the Rules of Court (Cap. 322, R 5) shall apply, with the necessary modifications, to the practice and procedure in any