78 Mr Ravi argued, on behalf of the plaintiff, that the words “no further proceedings shall be had” in r 13(4) are not imperative in nature. Mr Chan, on behalf of the defendant, argued (not surprisingly) otherwise. If one simply reads these words alone without more, it could possibly be argued that (from a strictly literal perspective) it is inconclusive as to whether or not a noncompliance with r 13 (as was the case here) would necessarily result in a dismissal of the plaintiff’s application. Here, again, however, I must emphasise the need to read the language of a provision not only in relation to the rest of the language in that (as well as related) provision but also in the context of the general intention of the Legislature in so far as that can be ascertained. Bearing these general and fundamental guidelines in mind, let us turn now to a more detailed analysis of r 13(4) itself. 79 I have already referred to Mr Ravi’s argument in the preceding paragraph. With respect, however, what Mr Ravi failed to refer to were the remaining words in r 13(4) itself. In particular, whilst the words relied upon by Mr Ravi (“no further proceedings shall be had”) occur in what I consider the first limb of r 13(4), one must also have regard to the second limb in that provision, and consider both limbs in context. 80 The second limb referred to in the preceding paragraph relates to the option on the part of t h e defendant to “apply by summons to the Judge for an order directing the dismissal of the application under section 90 and for the payment of the defendant’s costs”. Indeed, this is precisely what transpired, thus resulting in the present proceedings. It is important, in my view, to reiterate that the defendant has the option or choice as to whether or not to apply for a dismissal of the application for the plaintiff’s non-compliance with r 13. What happens, then, if the defendant elects not to apply for dismissal? This question in fact gives us a clue as to why the first limb of r 13(4) is phrased the way it is. In particular, it is clear that if the plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of r 13, “no further proceedings shall be had” with respect to his or her application under s 90 of the Act, regardless of whether or not the defendant decides to apply for the dismissal of the plaintiff’s application. This seems to me to be an eminently fair and sensible consequence. However, and this is where the second limb of r 13(4) comes into play, if the defendant chooses to exercise his or her right to apply to the court for an order directing the dismissal of the plaintiff’s application under s 90 of the Act, then the plaintiff’s application must necessarily be dismissed. To reiterate, if the defendant chooses not to exercise this option or choice, the first limb of r 13(4) makes it clear that the plaintiff cannot nevertheless take advantage of this by continuing with his or her application under s 90 of the Act. In other words, even if the defendant decides not to exercise his or her right to apply for dismissal under r 13(4), the proceedings initiated by the plaintiff would nevertheless cease. In my view, the entire structure and scheme of r 13(4) is eminently logical and fair. Rule 13(4) gives the defendant the right to apply to have the plaintiff’s application under s 90 of the Act dismissed but if, for whatever reason, the defendant chooses not to exercise this right, the plaintiff cannot take advantage of this as “no further proceedings shall be had” in relation to the plaintiff’s application under s 90 of the Act in any event. This interpretation of r 13(4) in fact buttresses the view that I have hitherto taken to the effect that r 13 is itself mandatory in nature. In other words, the non-compliance with r 13 is not one that can be excused – not even where the defendant himself or herself chooses not to take the matter to its logical conclusion by formally requesting that the plaintiff’s application be dismissed. 81 I pause, at this juncture, to note that while a distinction was drawn in the not too distant past between mandatory and directory provisions, the modern approach has been to focus on the relevant legislative intention instead. In the words of V K Rajah J in the Singapore High Court decision o f Re Rasmachayana Sulistyo; ex parte The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd [2005] 1 SLR 483 at [24]: