respondent and the court must then exercise that power. It is up to a respondent whether to apply for such an order or not. [emphasis added] 32 The learned judge then proceeded to deal with an important point that also arises in the present proceedings – the position of the plaintiff or applicant under s 90 in the context of his or her position as a layperson. In this regard, Lee J set out the following very helpful observations (ibid), as follows: Peremptory language is used by the rules and it behoves a petitioner to study the rules carefully so that every provision is complied with. For example, a petitioner brings ten charges against a respondent and pays $500 as security when he should pay $2,250 in all. Should the court allow such a petitioner to elect three charges out of the ten on a motion for dismissal? I think not. If a petitioner knows that he would be allowed to make an election he would every time present a petition by trumping up as many charges as possible and later electing three on a motion for dismissal. Also it would throw open the door to abusing the rule which clearly provides that “no further proceedings shall be had on the petition.” The court must therefore make it clear that there shall be no question of election. It is not a question of dismissing those charges a petitioner chooses to discard but the dismissal of the petition that rule 12(3) speaks of. The early determination of such matter can only be achieved if it is final. If there is a breach of the provision of this rule, it makes no difference whether the petitioner has misinterpreted or misunderstood it he must take the risk. The respondent is entitled to take advantage of a petitioner’s faults. The provisions of this rule must be strictly complied with. It was said that not all petitioners are rich and may require more time to find the requisite security. The remedy for this lies elsewhere. The court has no power to grant exemption from payment of security or to enlarge time. [emphasis added] 33 The Chong Thain Vun case was (in so far as the specific issue of security for costs is concerned) followed in the Malaysian High Court decision of the Norbert Choong case ([9] supra) and, most recently, in the (also) Malaysian High Court decision of Charlee Soh Cheng Hiong v Pengerusi Pilihan Raya Negeri Sarawak [2002] 261 MLJU 1 (“the Charlee Soh case”). 34 In so far as the Charlee Soh case is concerned, the following observations by Clement Skinner J are particularly apposite and merit quotation in full (and which ought, in the main, to be read together with the observations of Lee J in the Chong Thain Vun case quoted at [32] above): Mr. Soh’s explanation for failing to [furnish the requisite security for costs] is that on his enquiry at the registry as to how much he had to pay to file his petition, he was informed that the filing fees was RM80.00 which he duly paid. Mr. Soh’s explanation implies that he is not to be blamed for not having given security for costs as the registry did not inform him about this requirement of law. It is a matter of some regret that the assistance rendered to Mr. Soh by the court registry in informing him of the amount of filing fees payable should now be used by him as an excuse for not having given security for costs. I regret that I must reject any attempt by him to blame the registry. In the first place, it is incumbent on Mr. Soh as a person who wishes to avail himself to the right to challenge the result of an election to acquaint himself with the relevant provisions of law which gives him that right to do so because that right being a ‘special kind of right’, must be subject to the ‘limitations imposed’ by the statute that creates it. In the second place, I agree with learned Senior Federal Counsel that ignorance of the law is no excuse for noncompliance therewith. In the third place, it is not the function of the court to advise any party on how to go