6/25/2020
Details of 2017 (Gyo-Tsu) 47 | Judgments of the Supreme Court
that of the House of Representatives in dealing with various subject
matters including legislative matters and set a longer term of office
for the members of the House of Councillors, thereby having the will
of the people from diverse and long-term perspectives reflected in
national politics and controlling and balancing the authority of both
Houses, so as to ensure the stability and continuity of the
administration of national politics. It should be considered that it is
left to the Diet's reasonable discretion to determine what kind of
election system should be adopted in order to achieve said purpose of
the Constitution and to maintain a balance with the requirement of
equality in the value of votes, including how to define the
characteristics and functions of the House of Councillors and the
differences from the House of Representatives under a bicameral
system and how to reflect such definitions in the respective election
systems. Similar to (1) above, this reasoning is also in line with the
basic stance taken by the series of Grand Bench Judgments.
(3) As stated in (1) above, equality in the value of votes is not the sole
and absolute criterion for deciding the mechanism of the election
system, but it must be realized in harmony with other policy purposes
and grounds that the Diet is authorized to consider, and, as stated in
(2) above, there is a certain purpose for the Constitution adopting a
bicameral system for the Diet composition and differentiating the
House of Councillors from the House of Representatives in terms of
the scope of authority and the members' term of office. In view of the
above, it can be accepted as a reasonable exercise of the discretion
vested in the Diet to, in light of the House of Councillorsʼ way of being
and roles under the bicameral system, adopt an election system for
the House of Councillors that is different from that of the House of
Representatives, thereby reflecting the diverse opinions of the people
from all levels of civil society in election results and having the House
of Councillors perform unique functions that are different from those
of the House of Representatives. In deciding a specific mechanism of
the election system, it is not construed that the idea itself of taking
into account the significance and substance, etc. of each prefecture
serving as a political unit as one factor in view of adding the purpose
and function of collectively reflecting the will of the residents in
certain regions in election results should be denied. As long as it is in
harmony with the requirement of equality in the value of votes,
establishment of an election system is not construed to have gone
beyond the Diet's reasonable discretion just because it is based on
such a factor.
In determining the reasonableness of the Diet's exercise of discretion
regarding the establishment of the abovementioned election system,
the 2012 Grand Bench Judgment and the 2014 Grand Bench
Judgment pointed out that it is necessary to consider changes in the
circumstances surrounding the system and society over a long period
of time. As such changes, these judgments listed the fact that the
House of Councillors and the House of Representatives have adopted
a similar election system, the fact that the House of Councillors has
been playing an increasingly important role in the administration of
national politics, and the fact that a constituency standard for the
House of Representatives has been established with the aim of
keeping the disparity between constituencies in terms of population
basically lower than 1:2 in order to meet the requirement of equality
in the value of votes. It was pointed out that under these
circumstances, factors listed by the 1983 Grand Bench Judgment as
grounds for tolerating the prolonged existence of great disparity in the
value of votes no longer provided a sufficient reason for the disparity,
which was as great as about 1:5, to remain in existence over dozens
of years. In addition, it was held that, under the situation that the
Constitution does not require the use of a prefecture as a unit of
constituency̶on the contrary, the inflexible use of a prefecture as a
unit of constituency had caused such prolonged existence of great
disparity̶the abovementioned significance and substance, etc. of a
prefecture could no longer be held to be providing sufficient grounds
for the reasonableness of the abovementioned mechanism of the
election system. These judgments, however, just determined that the
inflexible use of a prefecture as a unit of constituency was a cause for
https://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1534
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