6/25/2020 Details of 2017 (Gyo-Tsu) 47 | Judgments of the Supreme Court system should be introduced to reflect the people s interests and opinions fairly and effectively in the political process. In view of this, equality in the value of votes is not the sole and absolute criterion for deciding the mechanism of the election system, but it must be realized in harmony with other policy purposes and grounds that the Diet is authorized to consider." It may be possible to adopt the view that the Diet is vested with broad discretion and permit the disparity in the value of one vote at a level of around 1:2 for elections of members of the House of Representatives. However, in light of the true nature of sovereignty of the people and representative democracy, I consider that equality in the value of one vote must be respected first and foremost in every national election as the sole and absolute criterion that takes precedence over everything. Only when this is accomplished can the representative democracy of Japan acquire legitimacy, being equally supported by all the people. Another view is that in elections of members of the House of Representatives, the disparity in the value of one vote at a level of around 1:2 is permissible and if the disparity is kept at such level, equality under the law can be considered to be secured. I cannot agree with this view. When it comes to the case where the disparity in the value of one vote is 1:2, if such disparity can be generally observed as leveling off between areas or constituencies through several elections, e.g. the value of one vote in a particular area or constituency in an election is two times larger, but it becomes one half as large in the next election as compared to such value in other areas or constituencies, the situation could narrowly be described as being in conformity with the requirement of equality under the law. However, looking at the attempts made thus far in demarcating constituencies, they have almost always failed to reduce the number of seats in time with regard to areas that experience population outflow, due to which people in these areas always have votes of greater value, while failing to increase the number of seats in time with regard to areas that experience population inflow, due to which people in these areas always have votes of lesser value. This means that people in the latter areas always have less chance to have their voices reflected in national politics, suggesting that a state that is not in conformity with the true nature of a representative democracy continues to exist. Therefore, I consider that in order to accomplish equality under the law under the current election system for national elections, the principle must be that there will be no disparity in the value of one vote, that is, in comparison between all constituencies, the value of a vote will be always 1.0. I see no harm in regarding this principle as the sole and absolute criterion for national elections. I admit that it may be inevitable that the disparity in the value of votes at a level of around 10 to 20 percent emerges depending on the demarcation of constituencies due to rapid population migration or certain technical reasons. Yet, even in such cases, the permissible level of disparity should be about 20 percent at a maximum, and I consider that an election system that would cause a level of disparity larger than this in the value of one vote is in violation of the provisions of equality under the law and therefore unconstitutional and void. 3. An equal election system is also required for the House of Councillors On the other hand, in light of the specific characteristics of the House of Councillors for which an election is scheduled every three years for half its members, as compared to the House of Representatives subject to dissolution by the constitutional authority of the Cabinet, it may not be completely impossible to tolerate a certain level of disparity in the value of one vote in elections of members of the House of Councillors as an inevitable consequence. However, political parties play an increasingly active role in the House of Councillors, as in the House of Representatives. Moreover, as is publicly known, the Diet was "twisted" for a while, that is, the majority parties in the House of Representatives did not hold a majority in the House of Councillors, and during the period when this phenomenon continued, https://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1534 20/24

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