6/25/2020
Details of 2017 (Gyo-Tsu) 47 | Judgments of the Supreme Court
system should be introduced to reflect the people s interests and
opinions fairly and effectively in the political process. In view of this,
equality in the value of votes is not the sole and absolute criterion for
deciding the mechanism of the election system, but it must be
realized in harmony with other policy purposes and grounds that the
Diet is authorized to consider." It may be possible to adopt the view
that the Diet is vested with broad discretion and permit the disparity
in the value of one vote at a level of around 1:2 for elections of
members of the House of Representatives. However, in light of the
true nature of sovereignty of the people and representative
democracy, I consider that equality in the value of one vote must be
respected first and foremost in every national election as the sole and
absolute criterion that takes precedence over everything. Only when
this is accomplished can the representative democracy of Japan
acquire legitimacy, being equally supported by all the people.
Another view is that in elections of members of the House of
Representatives, the disparity in the value of one vote at a level of
around 1:2 is permissible and if the disparity is kept at such level,
equality under the law can be considered to be secured. I cannot
agree with this view. When it comes to the case where the disparity in
the value of one vote is 1:2, if such disparity can be generally
observed as leveling off between areas or constituencies through
several elections, e.g. the value of one vote in a particular area or
constituency in an election is two times larger, but it becomes one
half as large in the next election as compared to such value in other
areas or constituencies, the situation could narrowly be described as
being in conformity with the requirement of equality under the law.
However, looking at the attempts made thus far in demarcating
constituencies, they have almost always failed to reduce the number
of seats in time with regard to areas that experience population
outflow, due to which people in these areas always have votes of
greater value, while failing to increase the number of seats in time
with regard to areas that experience population inflow, due to which
people in these areas always have votes of lesser value. This means
that people in the latter areas always have less chance to have their
voices reflected in national politics, suggesting that a state that is not
in conformity with the true nature of a representative democracy
continues to exist.
Therefore, I consider that in order to accomplish equality under the
law under the current election system for national elections, the
principle must be that there will be no disparity in the value of one
vote, that is, in comparison between all constituencies, the value of a
vote will be always 1.0. I see no harm in regarding this principle as the
sole and absolute criterion for national elections. I admit that it may
be inevitable that the disparity in the value of votes at a level of
around 10 to 20 percent emerges depending on the demarcation of
constituencies due to rapid population migration or certain technical
reasons. Yet, even in such cases, the permissible level of disparity
should be about 20 percent at a maximum, and I consider that an
election system that would cause a level of disparity larger than this
in the value of one vote is in violation of the provisions of equality
under the law and therefore unconstitutional and void.
3. An equal election system is also required for the House of
Councillors
On the other hand, in light of the specific characteristics of the House
of Councillors for which an election is scheduled every three years for
half its members, as compared to the House of Representatives
subject to dissolution by the constitutional authority of the Cabinet, it
may not be completely impossible to tolerate a certain level of
disparity in the value of one vote in elections of members of the
House of Councillors as an inevitable consequence. However, political
parties play an increasingly active role in the House of Councillors, as
in the House of Representatives. Moreover, as is publicly known, the
Diet was "twisted" for a while, that is, the majority parties in the
House of Representatives did not hold a majority in the House of
Councillors, and during the period when this phenomenon continued,
https://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1534
20/24
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