Previous 3 / 79 Next

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 Syllabus at ___, subordinating other districting criteria. Faced with this body of evidence, the District Court did not clearly err in finding that race predominated in drawing District 1; indeed, it could hardly have concluded anything but. Pp. 10–12. (b) North Carolina’s use of race as the predominant factor in designing District 1 does not withstand strict scrutiny. The State argues that it had good reasons to believe that it had to draw a majority-minority district to avoid liability for vote dilution under §2 of the VRA. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, identifies three threshold conditions for proving such a vote-dilution claim: (1) A “minority group” must be “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority” in some reasonably configured legislative district, id., at 50; (2) the minority group must be “politically cohesive,” id., at 51; and (3) a district’s white majority must “vote[ ] sufficiently as a bloc” to usually “defeat the minority’s preferred candidate,” ibid. If a State has good reason to think that all three of these conditions are met, then so too it has good reason to believe that §2 requires drawing a majority-minority district. But if not, then not. Here, electoral history provided no evidence that a §2 plaintiff could demonstrate the third Gingles prerequisite. For nearly 20 years before the new plan’s adoption, African-Americans made up less than a majority of District 1’s voters, but their preferred candidates scored consistent victories. District 1 thus functioned as a “crossover” district, in which members of the majority help a “large enough” minority to elect its candidate of choice. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U. S. 1, 13 (plurality opinion). So experience gave the State no reason to think that the VRA required it to ramp up District 1’s BVAP. The State counters that because it needed to substantially increase District 1’s population, the question facing the state mapmakers was not whether the then-existing District 1 violated §2, but whether the future District 1 would do so if drawn without regard to race. But that reasoning, taken alone, cannot justify the State’s race-based redesign of the district. Most important, the State points to no meaningful legislative inquiry into the key issue it identifies: whether a new, enlarged District 1, created without a focus on race, could lead to §2 liability. To have a strong basis to conclude that §2 demands race-based measures to augment a district’s BVAP, the State must evaluate whether a plaintiff could establish the Gingles preconditions in a new district created without those measures. Nothing in the legislative record here fits that description. And that is no accident: The redistricters believed that this Court’s decision in Strickland mandated a 50%-plus BVAP in District 1. They apparently reasoned that if, as Strickland held, §2 does not require crossover districts (for

Select target paragraph3

● ● ●

Cooper v. Harris

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether North Carolina's 2011 congressional redistricting plan used race as the predominant factor in drawing Districts 1 and 12, thereby triggering strict scrutiny — and, if so, whether the State's use of race was narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest (specifically, compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). A subsidiary issue was whether the legislature's pursuit of partisan advantage could explain the racial composition of the districts, thereby negating the claim that race predominated.

Alleged Acts: Following the 2010 U.S. Census, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a new congressional redistricting plan in 2011. Two districts in particular were challenged. District 1 had been a majority-minority district since 1992. The 2011 plan increased its Black voting-age population (BVAP) from 48.6% to 52.7%, drawing in new voters from heavily African American areas, which also increased the district's geographic sprawl. District 12 was a serpentine district running along Interstate 85. The 2011 plan increased its BVAP from 43.8% to 50.7%, adding approximately 35,000 additional Black voters and removing a comparable number of white voters. Voters in both districts (led by David Harris and Christine Baisden) sued, alleging that the legislature had used race as the predominant factor in drawing the districts, making them unconstitutional racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The State defended the districts by arguing that the use of race was justified by compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (avoiding vote dilution) and that District 12 was designed for partisan advantage, not racial considerations.

Procedural history: A three-judge panel struck down both Districts 1 and 12 as racial gerrymanders, holding that race was the predominant factor in their design and that the State had failed to satisfy strict scrutiny.

Summary: Cooper v. Harris is a significant racial gerrymandering decision in which the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling that North Carolina's 2011 congressional districts 1 and 12 were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. The Court reaffirmed the two-step framework for racial gerrymandering claims: (1) plaintiffs must prove that race was the predominant factor in the legislature's districting decisions, subordinating traditional districting principles; and (2) if race predominated, the State must show that its use of race was narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, such as compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court found that North Carolina had used racial targets (BVAP percentages) as the predominant factor in both districts and that the State's VRA justification was inadequate because it lacked a proper Gingles analysis and a "strong basis in evidence." The decision also addressed the complex intersection of race and party in redistricting, holding that a State's claim of partisan motivation does not shield it from strict scrutiny when the record shows that race was the predominant factor — even if race was used as a proxy for partisanship. The decision prompted North Carolina to adopt a new redistricting plan in 2016, which itself became the subject of further litigation in the partisan gerrymandering context.

Conclusion: In a 5–3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court and held that both Districts 1 and 12 were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. The Court found that the legislature had used a racial target (52.7% BVAP) as the predominant factor in drawing District 1, subordinating traditional districting principles like compactness and respect for political subdivisions. The State's justification under Section 2 of the VRA failed because it could not show that the three Gingles preconditions were satisfied — particularly that a coalition of minority voters could constitute a majority in a reasonably compact district. The Court held the State's belief that it needed to increase the BVAP above 50% to comply with the VRA was not a "strong basis in evidence" and that the narrow tailoring requirement was not met. The State argued that District 12 was drawn for partisan advantage, not race. The Court rejected this defense, holding that the record demonstrated the legislature had used race as a proxy for party affiliation and that the racial target (50.7% BVAP) was a predominant factor.

Legal Issue(s)

Electoral Maps and Districting
Voters' Rights

Applicable Law(s): Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: May 22, 2017

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1262_db8e.pdf

Primary Documents

Cooper v. Harris.pdf
English
Download View

Election Judgments - IFES

Select target paragraph3

Cooper v. Harris

Primary Documents

Notifications