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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus COOPER, GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL. v. HARRIS ET AL. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA No. 15–1262. Argued December 5, 2016—Decided May 22, 2017 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a State, in the absence of “sufficient justification,” from “separating its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race.” BethuneHill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 580 U. S. ___, ___. When a voter sues state officials for drawing such race-based lines, this Court’s decisions call for a two-step analysis. First, the plaintiff must prove that “race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 916. Second, if racial considerations did predominate, the State must prove that its race-based sorting of voters serves a “compelling interest” and is “narrowly tailored” to that end, Bethune-Hill, 580 U. S., at ___. This Court has long assumed that one compelling interest is compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA or Act). When a State invokes the VRA to justify race-based districting, it must show (to meet the “narrow tailoring” requirement) that it had “good reasons” for concluding that the statute required its action. Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U. S. ___, ___. A district court’s factual findings made in the course of this two-step inquiry are reviewed only for clear error. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a)(6); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U. S. 234, 242 (Cromartie II). This case concerns North Carolina’s redrawing of two congressional districts, District 1 and District 12, after the 2010 census. Prior to that redistricting, neither district had a majority black voting-age population (BVAP), but both consistently elected the candidates preferred by most African-American voters. The new map significantly altered both District 1 and District 12. The State needed to add al-

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Cooper v. Harris

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether North Carolina's 2011 congressional redistricting plan used race as the predominant factor in drawing Districts 1 and 12, thereby triggering strict scrutiny — and, if so, whether the State's use of race was narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest (specifically, compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). A subsidiary issue was whether the legislature's pursuit of partisan advantage could explain the racial composition of the districts, thereby negating the claim that race predominated.

Alleged Acts: Following the 2010 U.S. Census, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a new congressional redistricting plan in 2011. Two districts in particular were challenged. District 1 had been a majority-minority district since 1992. The 2011 plan increased its Black voting-age population (BVAP) from 48.6% to 52.7%, drawing in new voters from heavily African American areas, which also increased the district's geographic sprawl. District 12 was a serpentine district running along Interstate 85. The 2011 plan increased its BVAP from 43.8% to 50.7%, adding approximately 35,000 additional Black voters and removing a comparable number of white voters. Voters in both districts (led by David Harris and Christine Baisden) sued, alleging that the legislature had used race as the predominant factor in drawing the districts, making them unconstitutional racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The State defended the districts by arguing that the use of race was justified by compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (avoiding vote dilution) and that District 12 was designed for partisan advantage, not racial considerations.

Procedural history: A three-judge panel struck down both Districts 1 and 12 as racial gerrymanders, holding that race was the predominant factor in their design and that the State had failed to satisfy strict scrutiny.

Summary: Cooper v. Harris is a significant racial gerrymandering decision in which the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling that North Carolina's 2011 congressional districts 1 and 12 were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. The Court reaffirmed the two-step framework for racial gerrymandering claims: (1) plaintiffs must prove that race was the predominant factor in the legislature's districting decisions, subordinating traditional districting principles; and (2) if race predominated, the State must show that its use of race was narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, such as compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court found that North Carolina had used racial targets (BVAP percentages) as the predominant factor in both districts and that the State's VRA justification was inadequate because it lacked a proper Gingles analysis and a "strong basis in evidence." The decision also addressed the complex intersection of race and party in redistricting, holding that a State's claim of partisan motivation does not shield it from strict scrutiny when the record shows that race was the predominant factor — even if race was used as a proxy for partisanship. The decision prompted North Carolina to adopt a new redistricting plan in 2016, which itself became the subject of further litigation in the partisan gerrymandering context.

Conclusion: In a 5–3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court and held that both Districts 1 and 12 were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. The Court found that the legislature had used a racial target (52.7% BVAP) as the predominant factor in drawing District 1, subordinating traditional districting principles like compactness and respect for political subdivisions. The State's justification under Section 2 of the VRA failed because it could not show that the three Gingles preconditions were satisfied — particularly that a coalition of minority voters could constitute a majority in a reasonably compact district. The Court held the State's belief that it needed to increase the BVAP above 50% to comply with the VRA was not a "strong basis in evidence" and that the narrow tailoring requirement was not met. The State argued that District 12 was drawn for partisan advantage, not race. The Court rejected this defense, holding that the record demonstrated the legislature had used race as a proxy for party affiliation and that the racial target (50.7% BVAP) was a predominant factor.

Legal Issue(s)

Electoral Maps and Districting
Voters' Rights

Applicable Law(s): Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: May 22, 2017

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1262_db8e.pdf

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Cooper v. Harris.pdf
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Cooper v. Harris

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