Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 31 Opinion of the Court fied drawing of district lines based on race. An alternative map is merely an evidentiary tool to show that such a substantive violation has occurred; neither its presence nor its absence can itself resolve a racial gerrymandering claim.15 North Carolina insists, however, that we have already said to the contrary—more particularly, that our decision in Cromartie II imposed a non-negotiable “alternative-map requirement.” Brief for Appellants 31. As the State observes, Cromartie II reversed as clearly erroneous a trial court’s finding that race, rather than politics, predominated —————— 15 The dissent responds that an alternative-map requirement “should not be too hard” for plaintiffs (or at least “sophisticated” litigants “like those in the present case”) to meet. Post, at 10–11. But if the plaintiffs have already proved by a preponderance of the evidence that race predominated in drawing district lines, then we have no warrant to demand that they jump through additional evidentiary hoops (whether the exercise would cost a hundred dollars or a million, a week’s more time or a year’s). Or at least that would be so if we followed the usual rules. Underlying the dissent’s view that we should not—that we should instead create a special evidentiary burden—is its belief that “litigation of this sort” often seeks to “obtain in court what [a political party] could not achieve in the political arena,” post, at 9, and so that little is lost by making suits like this one as hard as possible. But whatever the possible motivations for bringing such suits (and the dissent says it is not questioning “what occurred here,” ibid.), they serve to prevent legislatures from taking unconstitutional districting action—which happens more often than the dissent must suppose. State lawmakers sometimes misunderstand the VRA’s requirements (as may have occurred here with respect to §5), leading them to employ race as a predominant districting criterion when they should not. See supra, at 22–24, and n. 10. Or they may resort to race-based districting for ultimately political reasons, leveraging the strong correlation between race and voting behavior to advance their partisan interests. See nn. 1, 7, supra. Or, finally—though we hope less commonly—they may simply seek to suppress the electoral power of minority voters. When plaintiffs meet their burden of showing that such conduct has occurred, there is no basis for subjecting them to additional—and unique—evidentiary hurdles, preventing them from receiving the remedy to which they are entitled.