Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 579 Filed 08/15/19 Page 21 of 153 III. CONTINUING VULNERABILITY AND UNRELIABILITY OF GEORGIA’S GEMS/DRE SYSTEM AND VOTER REGISTRATION SYSTEM AND DATABASE A. Georgia’s DREs operate on outdated and vulnerable software. The 2000 presidential election spurred the national transition from mechanical to electronic voting machines and from manual to automated processes. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, et al. Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy at 109 (National Academies Press, 2018) (“National Academies Report” or “NAS Report”). In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”) and authorized the allocation of $3 billion to the states, primarily for the purchasing of new voting technology.18 As a result, federal funding pursuant to HAVA led to the development and deployment of new voting machines, and in particular, a more widespread deployment of DRE devices. (Id.) While HAVA provided necessary funding for improved voting technology, contemporaneous with the Act’s passage, technologies had existing security and operational flaws. available voting (Id. at 110.) For example, “DRE machines did not produce a means for voter verification.” (Id.) HAVA contained no provisions for future funding of replacement voting machines or updates to the system. (Id.) Consequently, in 2018 the National Academies of Science concluded: Significantly, HAVA also required every state to implement a single centralized, computerized, statewide voter registration list containing the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the State. 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A). 18 21