Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 579 Filed 08/15/19 Page 35 of 153 Dr. Halderman and Dr. DeMillo also explained in their testimony in detail the reasons why the DRE auditing and confirmation of results process and parallel testing of DREs used by state officials on a restricted sample basis is of limited value. (Halderman testimony at hearing; Halderman Decl., Doc. 260-2 ¶¶ 35-48; see also DeMillo Decl., Doc. 277, Ex. C ¶¶ 10-20.) This evidence was buttressed by a mounting tide of research and testing by the nation’s leading election cybersecurity experts in election cybersecurity. The consensus of these experts, recently reaffirmed by the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine and the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reports in September 2018 and July 2019 respectively, has reached national prominence in the general public’s understanding of election security. As the Amicus Brief of the Electronic Privacy Information Center discusses, almost from their inception, DREs have been plagued by warnings that the voting machines are unreliable, insecure, unverifiable.32 As the evidence presented by See, e.g., Eric A. Fischer, Cong. Research Serv., RL32139, Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems (DREs): Analysis of Security Issues (2003) (“there appears to be an emerging consensus that in general, current DREs do not adhere sufficiently to currently accepted security principles for computer systems”); David L. Dill, Bruce Schneier & Barbara Simons, Voting and Technology: Who Gets to Count Your Vote?, 46 Communications of the ACM 29 (Aug. 2003) (explaining, “[a] computer can easily display one set of votes on the screen for confirmation by the voter while recording entirely different votes in electronic memory, either because of a programming error or a malicious design”); Tadayoshi Kohno, et al., Analysis of an Electronic Voting System, 2004 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 27 (2004) (discussing researchers’ findings that DRE software is significantly flawed after the source code for a DRE voting machine was accidentally posted online); Joseph A. Calandrino, et al., Source Code Review of the Diebold Voting System 10, Univ. of Cal. (July 20, 2007) (finding the systems of California’s DREs were susceptible to viruses and malicious software, i.e. “malware”); Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, & Edward W. Felten, Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVoteTS Voting Machine, USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2007) (“[A]nyone who has physical access to a voting machine, or to a memory card that will later be 32 35