Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 579 Filed 08/15/19 Page 39 of 153 [A]ll digital information – such as ballot definitions, voter choice records, vote tallies, or voter registration lists – is subject to malicious alteration; there is no technical mechanism currently available that can ensure that a computer application – such as one used to record or count votes – will produce accurate results; testing alone cannot ensure that systems have not been compromised; and any computer system used for elections – such as a voting machine or e-pollbook – can be rendered inoperable. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, et al. Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy 42, 80 (National Academies Press, 2018) (“National Academies Report” or “NAS Report”). The NAS report identified several risks and usability problems with DRE voting machines. (Id. at 78.) The advent of DREs in the early 2000s introduced “new technical challenges,” such as touchscreen miscalibration, which causes a voter’s intended selection of one candidate to be misinterpreted as a vote for another candidate. (Id.) However, the NAS was even more concerned about the risk of undetectable cyberattacks on DREs that lack a “paper artifact that could be manually counted.” (Id.) Furthermore, the NAS report emphasized that any voting system should allow a voter to verify that the recorded ballot reflects his or her intent, which isn’t possible with paperless DRE machines. Although some concerns with DREs are alleviated if the machines create voter verified paper audit trails (VVPATs), the NAS report notes that “it is possible that the information stored in a computer’s memory does not reflect what is printed on the VVPAT.” (Id.) The NAS also endorsed the use of “risk-limiting audits,” in which individual randomly selected paper ballots are examined until sufficient statistical assurance is obtained. (Id. 39