Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 579 Filed 08/15/19 Page 9 of 153 Primary as well as a pilot of the system in 6 counties in the November 2019 elections. See Dominion contract and award documents, available at https://sos.ga.gov/securevoting (last visited August 13, 2019). The State’s response to the current Motions for Preliminary Injunction focused on four themes: (1) The State contends it has taken substantial proactive, corrective action by passing new election legislation to implement a reliable and secure new election data system based on ballot marking devices, auditable scanned paper ballot printouts, and ballot scanners/tabulators statewide for the 2020 March Presidential Preference Primary.10 As a result, Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief to bar the use of the DRE system in the 2019 off-cycle elections will cause municipalities and counties to incur significant The State’s contract with Dominion calls for in-precinct scanner/tabulators for the “paper” ballots generated by the Ballot Marking Devices (“BMDs”). The contract also calls for rapid full ballot image/ballot counting scanners for absentee and provisional ballots that are handled in the board of elections office in each county. The printer attached to each BMD used for inperson voting on which the elector electronically marks her vote produces a printed list of the candidates the elector has voted for as opposed to an image of the entire completed ballot as it actually appears on the BMD device screen or if printed on an absentee ballot. The ballot scanner tabulates the selections from each ballot based on the bar code imprinted on the paper printout scanned as opposed to the listing of candidates. The Plaintiffs point out that no elector can visually review and confirm whether the bar code accurately conveys her votes actually cast, as filled out on the BMD screen or appearing on the printout. In other words, a voter cannot verify upon inspection what the bar code on the ballot signifies, i.e., what vote it actually is recording. The State appears to rely on its assessment of the reliability of the equipment software as a whole, the scanner, and the provision of auditing to address this concern. The parties also appear to dispute whether the bar code feature of the new ballot system is consistent with the requirements of the legislation. The State’s own expert, Dr. Michael Shamos is not a fan of the type of ballot marking devices chosen by Georgia for its new $106 million election system that rely on a computer-generated barcode to tabulate the votes, the accuracy of which cannot be verified by the voter. (Shamos Dep. at 56-57.) He agrees that the more reliable approach is the use of a BMD that produces a paper record of the vote tabulation readable by the human voter. (Id. at 57.) In any event, this dispute as to the reliability of the bar code voting modality as a transparent, reliable mechanism or it’s conformity with state law is one not encompassed in the preliminary injunction motions before this Court. 10 9