Page: 13 [72] Finally, the Respondent notes that the proportionality test, which was not satisfied by the government respondents in both de Jong and Figueroa, should now be deemed met, given the revised refund provisions. The current deposit amount is “fully refundable and tied to the actual expense associated with enforcing compliance with reporting requirements.” Analysis re Justification [73] In de Jong at para 53, Perell J succinctly articulated the analytical framework for justifying a Charter violation in the following words: Under the Oakes test, the government must establish that the objective or purpose of the impugned legislation is sufficiently “pressing and substantial” to warrant overriding the constitutionally protected right. If that first test is met, then the government must establish that the means adopted to achieve the legislative objective are proportional to that objective by showing that the means chosen to achieve the objective: (1) are rationally connected to the objective and not arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations; (2) impair the guaranteed right as little as reasonably possible; and (3) achieve proportionality between the effects on the rights in question and the importance of the legislative objective, and in some cases between the deleterious and salutary effects of the measures themselves. See also, Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada at 38-37; Harvey at paras 30, 35. [74] Foremost, I think it is critically important for me to distinguish the Federal Court’s decision in Shebib, which the Respondent relied on in its submissions. Unlike the situation in Shebib, where the Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not plead the material facts necessary to support their Charter arguments, I am satisfied that the Applicant in the matter before me specifically invoked the Charter in his Originating Application and in addition filed affidavit evidence that indicates the facts as to how his financial circumstances would be impacted by the impugned Deposit Requirement Provision. [75] That said, it has been fairly accepted that “the deposit provisions under the federal elections legislation addressed the pressing and substantial objectives of protecting: (1) the public purse for some expenses incurred in administering the election; and (2) the integrity of the electoral system through the deterrence of frivolous candidates”: de Jong at para 54. The Lortie Commission that was constituted by the federal government to look into electoral reform also “recognized that the purpose of the deposit requirement was to deter frivolous candidates and to ensure that a candidate was serious and committed to the electoral process” Ibid at 57. [76] In my opinion, ensuring the legitimacy of the electoral process is, on its face, a reasonable objective. The Supreme Court, in Figueroa SCC at para 72, confirmed that “preserving the integrity of the electoral process is a pressing and substantial concern in a free and democratic state.” 2017 ABQB 645 (CanLII) votes received. In other words, since the deposit is now fully refundable, the Respondent argues that the impugned Deposit Requirement Provision minimally impairs the potential candidate’s s 3 Charter right. In this context, the Respondent points to the Lortie Report, which indicated a lesser amount could not achieve the deterrent effect.