Page: 15 rational connection is in error. (See, Michael A. Johnston, “Section 1 and the Oakes Test: A Critical Analysis” (2009) 26 Nat’l J Const L 85 at 100-103; de Jong at para 66). [86] Justice Molloy, in Figueroa at para 43, noted: If there is a legitimate need to limit participation in the electoral process only to serious candidates who have a measure of public support, alternative means are available which do not impose financial obstacles to discourage candidacy. One obvious example is the recommendation by the Lortie Commission that the nomination by, residents in the constituency be the measure of public support. Lortie proposed that “only those who do not meet their obligations under the Act should be penalized” and that “the deposit is not to deter frivolous candidates; this objective is achieved by requiring public endorsement for a nomination”. [87] This view was endorsed by Perell J in de Jong at para 71, where he said: [t]he requirement of obtaining signatures to accompany the nominating papers may serve purposes other than being a measure of seriousness [...] and this requirement minimally impairs, if it impairs at all, the ability of the candidate’s party to communicate its message. [88] The significance of these comments is that, given the possibility of using the signature requirement as alternative means (or measure) to attain the same objectives of deterring frivolous or non-serious candidates and preserving the integrity of the electoral process, the impugned Deposit Requirement Provision of the Act cannot be justified as a minimal impairment. [89] Consequently, I find that the Respondent has failed to satisfy the minimal impairment element of the Oakes test. [90] The last factor of the Oakes test, which is being considered in light of my earlier finding, asks whether or not the salutary benefits of the impugned Deposit Requirement Provision of the Act outweigh its deleterious effects? [91] When the salutary benefits inherent in the objective of deterring non-serious candidates is juxtaposed with deleterious effect of depriving otherwise serious but financially challenged candidates from presenting or communicating their ideas and opinions to the general public by diverting funds that could be used to communicate a political message, then it is logical to conclude that there is a disconnect between effects and objective. [92] In the result, I find that the Respondent has not met the proportionality requirement of the Oakes test Disposition [93] I conclude that only the Deposit Requirement Provision of the Act is in breach of the Charter right of each citizen to be eligible to participate meaningfully in the electoral process as a candidate. 2017 ABQB 645 (CanLII) [85] The inquiry then leads me to ask: Does the impugned Deposit Requirement Provision of the Act minimally impair the Charter right in question?