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COMMUNIST PARTY OF RUSSIA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
ii. Alleged manipulation of the media by the Government
111. In most of the previous cases under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 the
Court has had to consider a specific legislative provision or a known
administrative measure which has somehow limited the electoral rights of a
group of the population or of a specific candidate. In those cases the
measure complained of lay within the legal field, and, therefore, could be
easily identified and analysed (see, for example, the cases concerning
electoral thresholds (Yumak and Sadak, cited above), the right of prisoners
to vote (Hirst, cited above), criteria of eligibility of candidates on account of
their political affiliation or other status (Ždanoka, cited above; Seyidzade
v. Azerbaijan, no. 37700/05, 3 December 2009), compositions of electoral
commissions (The Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, ECHR
2008), restrictions on reporting on a particular political movement (Purcell
and Others v. Ireland, no. 15404/89, 16 April 1991), or impossibility for
nationals living abroad to vote (Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos
v. Greece [GC], no. 42202/07, 15 March 2012).
112. The situation in the present case is different. The applicants did not
deny that Russian law guaranteed neutrality of the broadcasting companies,
making no distinction between pro-governmental and opposition parties,
and proclaimed the principle of editorial independence of the broadcasting
companies. They claimed, however, that the law was not complied with in
practice, and that de jure neutrality of the five nationwide channels did not
exist de facto.
113. The applicant’s position in the present case can be narrowed down
to three main factual assertions. First, the applicants alleged that media
coverage on the five TV channels had been predominantly hostile to the
opposition parties and candidates. Secondly, they asserted that it was a
result of a political manipulation, that the executive authorities and/or
United Russia had used their influence to impose a policy on the TV
companies which had helped to promote United Russia. Thirdly, the
applicants claimed that biased media coverage on TV had affected public
opinion to a critical extent, and had made the elections not “free”.
114. As to the first point, the Court observes that the Supreme Court in
its judgment of 16 December 2004 did not find that the media coverage had
been equal in all respects. Many observers (in particular the OSCE and the
CEC Working Group, see paragraphs 20 and 26 above) which monitored
the elections noted that the TV media coverage was unfavourable to the
opposition. The Supreme Court’s conclusion was formulated more carefully
and in a qualified manner: it noted that the tenor of media coverage on TV
during the elections had not been so “egregious” to make the ascertaining of
the genuine will of the voters impossible.
115. The answer given by the Supreme Court to the applicant’s first
point was somewhat elusive. Conversely, on the other two propositions of
the applicants the Supreme Court was more explicit. It found in essence that