432
FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. COLORADO
REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN COMM.
Syllabus
enforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate. Id., at
623-626. On remand, the District Court held for the Party on that
claim, and a divided Tenth Circuit panel affirmed.
Held. Because a party's coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures
truly independent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention of
the Act's contribution limits, the Party's facial challenge is rejected.
Pp. 440-465.
(a) Political expenditure limits deserve closer scrutiny than contribution restrictions, e. g., Buckley, 424 U. S., at 14-23, because expenditure restraints generally curb more expressive and associational activity
than contribution limits, e. g., id., at 19-23, and because unlimited contributions are more clearly linked to political corruption than other kinds
of unlimited political spending, at least where the spending is not coordinated with a candidate or his campaign, e. g., id., at 47. Although the
First Amendment line is easy to draw when it falls between independent expenditures by individuals or political action committees (PACs)
without any candidate's approval and contributions in the form of cash
gifts to candidates, see, e. g., id., at 19-23, facts speak less clearly once
the independence of the spending cannot be taken for granted. Congress's functional treatment of coordinated expenditures by individuals
and nonparty groups like contributions prevents attempts to circumvent the Act through coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised
contributions. Id., at 47. Buckley, in fact, enhanced the significance
of this functional treatment by striking down independent expendi.ture limits on First Amendment grounds while upholding limitations
on contributions (by individuals and nonparty groups), as defined to include coordinated expenditures. Id., at 23-59. Colorado I addressed
the FEC's effort to stretch the functional treatment one step further.
Because Buckley had treated some coordinated expenditures like contributions and upheld their limitation, the FEC's argument went, the
Party Expenditure Provision should stand as applied to all party election spending, see, e. g., 518 U. S., at 619-623. Holding otherwise, the
principal opinion found that, because "independent" party expenditures
are no more likely to serve corruption than independent expenditures
by anyone else, there was no justification for subjecting party election
spending across the board to the kinds of limits previously invalidated
when applied to individuals and nonparty groups. See id., at 616. But
that still left the question whether the First Amendment allows coordinated election expenditures by parties to be treated functionally as
contributions, the way coordinated expenditures by other entities are
treated. The issue in this case is, accordingly, whether a party is in a
different position from other political speakers, giving it a claim to de-