Cite as: 533 U. S. 431 (2001) THOMAS, J., dissenting limiting expenditures whose special value as expenditures is also the source of their power to corrupt. Congress is entitled to its choice. * * * We hold that a party's coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures truly independent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention of contribution limits. We therefore reject the Party's facial challenge and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. It is so ordered. JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JusTICE KENNEDY join, and with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins as to Part II, dissenting. The Party Expenditure Provision, 2 U. S. C. §441a(d)(3), severely limits the amount of money that a national or state committee of a political party can spend in coordination with its own candidate for the Senate or House of Representatives. See ante, at 438-439, and n. 3. Because this provision sweeps too broadly, interferes with the party-candidate relationship, and has not been proved necessary to combat corruption, I respectfully dissent. I As an initial matter, I continue to believe that Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), should be overruled. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 410 (2000) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. FederalElection Comm'n, 518 U. S. 604, 631 (1996) (ColoradoI) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). "Political speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection," Shrink Missouri, supra, at 410-411 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see also Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central