Cite as: 533 U. S. 431 (2001) THOMAS, J., dissenting tures are constitutionally invalid, see Buckley, supra, at 58-59; see also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative PoliticalAction Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 501 (1985). The rationale for this distinction between contributions and independent expenditures has been that, whereas ceilings on contributions by individuals and political committees "entai[l] only a marginal restriction" on First Amendment interests, Buckley, 424 U. S., at 20, limitations on independent expenditures "impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association," id., at 23. A The Court notes this existing rationale and attempts simply to treat coordinated expenditures by political parties as equivalent to contributions by individuals and political committees. Thus, at least implicitly, the Court draws two conclusions: coordinated expenditures are no different from contributions, and political parties are no different from individuals and political committees. Both conclusions are flawed. 1 The Court considers a coordinated expenditure to be an "'expenditur[e] made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents."' Ante, at 438 (quoting 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i)). This definition covers a broad array of conduct, some of which is akin to an independent expenditure. At one extreme, to be sure, are outlays that are "virtually indistinguishable from simple contributions." Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 624 (opinion of BREYER, J.). An example would be "a donation of money with direct payment of a candidate's media bills." Ibid. But toward the other end of the spectrum are expenditures that largely resemble, and should be entitled to the same protection as, independent expenditures.