Bundestag election are said to be unlawful. The complainant re 2. complains over and above this that the proceedings of the German Bundestag suffered from a number of faults. a) aa) The complainant re 1. objected to the result of the elections to the 16th German Bundestag in 30 constituencies in Brandenburg, Hesse, North RhineWestphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony-Anhalt referred to in greater detail. He moved to ascertain the constituencies in which computer-controlled voting machines had been used, and the number of the votes cast with these voting machines, and to repeat the elections in the constituencies concerned. The deployment of computercontrolled voting machines was said to have violated the principle of the public nature of elections and the principle of the official nature of elections. Over and above this, the voting machines were said not to be compatible with the Guidelines for the Construction of Voting Machines. 34 The principle of the public nature of elections was said to guarantee the proper implementation of the elections and the correct constitution of Parliament. The monitoring of the election act was said to have to encompass above all ensuring that the marking of the vote took place secretly and that the votes cast by the voters were inserted into the ballot box without a change, that the votes were not subsequently altered and that only the votes from the ballot box were counted at the end of the election. In the deployment of the voting machines complained of, effective monitoring by the public and by the returning committee were said to be prevented since a major part of the election act and the investigation and ascertainment of the election result were said to take place inside the voting machine. 35 If voting machines were deployed, it was said to only replace the public nature of elections possible in an election with voting slips if equivalent and publicly verifiable control mechanisms existed, such as a paper record of the votes cast printed by the voting machine which the voter could inspect. Corresponding control possibilities were however said not to be available to the public in deployment of the Nedap voting machines. 36 It was said not to be possible for the public to check the trustworthiness of the software installed in the voting machines. The examination by the PhysikalischTechnische Bundesanstalt and the type approval were said not to have taken place publicly; also, the voting machines were said not to be made available to the interested public for independent examination. The source code software of the voting machines was said not to be open. Ultimately, it was said also not to be possible to examine whether the copies of the software used in the polling stations were identical to the sample examined by the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt and whether they were free of manipulations. It was said to be possible to effect authentication by a chain of characters (“hash value”) being calculated for each original program and the copy and then compared, so that agreement between the two values was said to document the authenticity of the software. This was however said not to be reliably 37 9/37

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