24 LOUISIANA v. CALLAIS Opinion of the Court Amendment enforcement power. See, e.g., I. N. S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (“[I]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly possible,’ we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems” (citation omitted)). By contrast, interpreting §2 of the Voting Rights Act to outlaw a map solely because it fails to provide a sufficient number of majority-minority districts would create a right that the Amendment does not protect. And such an interpretation would run headlong into the Act’s express disclaimer against racial proportionality. Properly understood, §2 thus does not intrude on States’ prerogative to draw districts based on nonracial factors. “Redistricting constitutes a traditional domain of state legislative authority.” Alexander, 602 U. S., at 7. The Constitution imposes some important restrictions on the States’ exercise of this power, but they are otherwise free to draw districts as they please. We have held that they may use traditional districting factors such as “compactness, contiguity,” “maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions, preserving the core of existing districts,” and protecting incumbents. Bush, 517 U. S., at 964; Miller, 515 U. S., at 906, 916. Nothing in the Constitution requires States to heed these criteria, of course, and the desirability of some of these criteria might be disputed. But because they are not forbidden by the Constitution, it is up to each State to decide what weight, if any, they warrant. The same is true with respect to the drawing of districts to achieve partisan advantage. Disapproval of partisan gerrymandering dates back to the founding. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U. S. 684, 696–697 (2019). But partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable in federal court. Id., at 718. “Federal judges have no license to reallocate political power between the two major political parties, with no plausible grant of authority in the

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