30 LOUISIANA v. CALLAIS Opinion of the Court maps help to “disentangle race” from politics and other constitutionally permissible considerations. Ibid. 2. Second and Third Gingles Preconditions To satisfy the second and third preconditions—politically cohesive voting by the minority and racial-bloc voting by the majority—the plaintiffs must provide an analysis that controls for party affiliation. In other words, they must show that voters engage in racial bloc voting that cannot be explained by partisan affiliation. This is, once again, critical for “disentangl[ing] race and politics.” Alexander, 602 U. S., at 6. The facts of Gingles afford a good example of how a §2 plaintiff can properly meet these preconditions. There, as discussed, black and white voters had dramatically different voting patterns within the Democratic party. 478 U. S., at 59. This type of intra-party racial-bloc voting pattern helps to demonstrate that the minority plaintiffs have “less opportunity” than their majority counterparts because of race, not just because of partisan affiliation. 52 U. S. C. §10301(b). By contrast, simply pointing to inter-party racial polarization proves nothing, because “ ‘a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats happen to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of that fact.’ ” Alexander, 602 U. S., at 9 (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U. S. 541, 551 (1999)). 3. Totality of Circumstances Last, the “totality of circumstances” inquiry must focus on evidence that has more than a remote bearing on what the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits: present-day intentional racial discrimination regarding voting. Discrimination that occurred some time ago, as well as present-day disparities that are characterized as the ongoing “effects of societal discrimination,” are entitled to much