Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 35 Opinion of the Court black voters had faced intentional discrimination in recent years. Id., at 847. That analysis had its priorities backwards. The Fifteenth Amendment, which the Voting Rights Act enforces, “is not designed to punish for the past” but works “to ensure a better future.” Shelby County, 570 U. S., at 553. The focus of §2 must therefore be on “current conditions,” not on “decades-old data relevant to decades-old problems.” Ibid. And none of the historical evidence presented by plaintiffs came close to showing an objective likelihood that the State’s challenged map was the result of intentional racial discrimination. In sum, because the Voting Rights Act did not require Louisiana to create an additional majority-minority district, no compelling interest justified the State’s use of race in creating SB8. That map is an unconstitutional gerrymander, and its use would violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. V The dissent’s arguments are fully addressed in the prior sections of this opinion, but in closing we emphasize three points. First, the dissent states over and over again that our decision requires a §2 plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent. Post, at 6, 23–26, 30–32, 37, 39–41, 45–46. What must be shown is exactly what the 1982 amendment of §2 called for. A §2 plaintiff in a vote dilution case must show that a districting scheme denies members of a racial group the same “opportunity” as other voters to elect the candidates they prefer. Supra, at 20–22. When that is shown, the circumstances are comparable to those in White, 412 U. S. 755, the decision from which the new language added by Congress in 1982 was drawn. That is, the circumstances must give rise to a strong inference of racial discrimination. See supra, at 23–26.